


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JAPAN

Chemical Plants Face Inspection Under CW Convention

*OW2703084793 Tokyo KYODO in English 0652 GMT
27 Mar 93*

[Text] Tokyo, March 27 KYODO—The Trade Ministry said Saturday about 100 chemical factories in Japan are liable to inspection by international organizations under an international treaty for a ban on chemical weapons. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry said 2,000 to 3,000 factories, about half of all chemical factories in Japan, will be required to submit reports on their operations to the government regularly.

Under the pact signed in Geneva last January and due to take effect in 1995, agricultural chemicals and semiconductor plants are required to accept inspection or submit regular reports to the government when they produce more than 200 tons of chemicals of a special type annually, ministry officials said.

Factories are divided into five categories according to levels of risks with those designed to manufacture chemicals weapons classified in the top ranking group. No Japanese factories belong to the top ranking category, the officials said.

The officials said factories manufacturing chemicals ranging from highly toxic cyanide to less harmful phosphorus, sulfur and fluorine will be subject to inspection by international organizations. The ministry plans to conduct a survey on chemical factories across the nation in fiscal 1993, starting April 1, they said.

ARGENTINA**Senate Ratifies Tlatelolco Treaty Banning Nuclear Arms**

*PY2503020493 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS
in Spanish 2329 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 24 Mar (NA)—The Senate tonight ratified, with the approval of all blocs, the Tlatelolco Treaty that bans nuclear arms in Latin American and the Caribbean.

The Tlatelolco Treaty, which was sent to the Chamber of Deputies, promotes the creation in Latin American and the Caribbean of a free zone in which the member states

commit themselves to ban and prevent in any way the testing, use, manufacture, production, purchase, storage, installation, or deployment of nuclear arms.

The Tlatelolco Treaty was amended three times, after it was signed in Mexico on 14 February 1967, following demands by our country, which opposed its ratification, objecting the control system established in the treaty to monitor compliance with its goals.

Following the amendments implemented in 1992, Argentina decided to ratify the treaty. The appropriate bill was submitted to Congress and now the Senate has approved it. [passage omitted]

GENERAL

Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept

93WC0042A Moscow KONTSEPTSIYA VNESHNEY
POLITIKI ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII in English
25 Jan 93 pp 1-58

[Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Concept Document, No. 1615/IS, dated 25 January 1993: "Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation." For the full text of the document, see the subtitled FBIS Report: Central Eurasia—Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, FBIS-USR-93-037, 25 March 1993.]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Arms Control and International Security

II. Arms Control and International Security. The end of the East-West confrontation has practically removed the question of the emergence of a full-scale and particularly a premeditated military confrontation. At the same time, the risks associated with the presence of a strong military infrastructure are retained, as are the challenges of the new global situation, primarily the possibility of uncontrollable escalation of regional conflicts in zones of instability and the danger of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Under these conditions, the following basic tasks arise:

- to strengthen the process of transition of the international system of security at the global as well as at the regional levels from the principles of bloc opposition to cooperative principles which presuppose joint efforts of the most varied states in maintaining stability by political means;
- to strive toward attaining appropriate international legal agreements on issues of arms limitation and disarmament, as well as toward increasing mutual understanding, trust and partnership with the leading countries of the world, including interaction with the Western defense structures;
- to bring the military potential into correspondence with the new conditions, having removed from our arsenal weapons which are not dictated by necessity (intercontinental systems over the specified quantities, conventional systems in excess of those agreed upon in accordance with existing treaties and agreements), and whose very maintenance is burdensome to the economy and entails the risk of accidental or unsanctioned use;
- to maintain the retained weapons at the level of sufficiency for defense, ensuring the effect of containment in regard to potential threats along the perimeter of the borders, as well as in distant foreign countries, especially taking into account the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. For the foreseeable future, the reformed military potential of Russia will remain an important factor in safeguarding its vitally important interests.

The primary directions and specific steps and measures for achieving these goals, which are tied into a formulated and

properly approved concept of national security, must proceed in the course of military reform in Russia and be commensurate with the country's economic and social capabilities.

For the near future, the primary directions of the disarmament process will be as follows:

1. The realization of achieved agreements on the reduction of conventional and nuclear arms. At the same time, efforts will be undertaken to ease the financial expenditures associated with cutbacks and their control.

2. Implementation of the principles of the Russian-American START II Treaty after its ratification; further development of the idea presented by the president for creating a global system of defense against ballistic missiles and other delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction, including efforts at involving in its implementation states which are significant on a military level.

3. Concentration of total control over the nuclear forces of the former USSR in the hands of Russia through the transfer of the appropriate means onto its territory and their subsequent elimination; the practical realization of existing agreements on the nuclear-free status of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, their joining in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states, and the creation of a system of monitoring non-proliferation within the framework of the CIS.

4. Involvement of Russia as an equal participant in the practice of control over the export of missile technology.

5. Conclusion of work on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; the adoption of measures for the removal of any concerns with regard to the fulfillment of the Biological Weapons Convention.

6. Continuation of the dialogue for the purpose of comparing the military doctrines of Russia and its main partners, primarily the United States, based on the task of consolidating on a functional level the attained understanding that they no longer view each other as military enemies.

7. Continued efforts in favor of further significant limitation of nuclear testing, with the ultimate goal of its general and total prohibition.

8. Coordination of multilateral agreements on principles applicable to arms export, aimed at maintaining stability while respecting the legal commercial interests of Russia; development of a domestic legislative base which makes it possible to control arms shipments under the new economic conditions, the development of a system of export control and issuance of licenses for arms trade.

9. Aid in the development and implementation of a program for conversion of the defense industry, including the organization of appropriate international interaction and the involvement of foreign investors.

10. Ensuring fulfillment of the intergovernmental agreement, "On Coordinating Work in Matters Relating to Export Controls for Raw Materials, Materials, Equipment,

Technologies and Services That May Be Used to Develop Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Delivery Systems" (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine); the creation of working agencies to implement the practical interaction of CIS participants in this sphere.

11. Achieving greater openness in the military sphere, including in regard to defense budgets; developing continued measures of stabilization, trust and transparency within the framework of the CSCE process.

12. Coordinating and realizing plans of cooperation for 1993 with NATO and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council; increasing contacts on a bilateral and multilateral basis; interacting with NATO agencies on matters of strengthening peace and security by means of developing political contacts, military ties, exchange visits, conducting joint maneuvers, exchange of experience, and interaction in the settling of crisis situations. [Passage omitted]

Relations With the United States

IV. Relations With the United States. For the foreseeable future, relations with the United States will retain a prominent place on the scale of Russia's foreign policy priorities, corresponding to the position and weight of the United States in world affairs. The development of full-fledged relations with the United States is capable of facilitating the creation of a favorable foreign environment for the implementation of domestic economic reforms in Russia.

Of course, there are forces in the United States which skeptically evaluate the possibilities of a Russian-American partnership. However, the prevailing tendency, which rests on the two-party principle, is the line toward increased cooperation with Russia.

Such a course is predetermined by the fundamental national interests of the United States, which are not subject to domestic political conditions. It is true, there are also some inhibiting factors—rather strong neo-isolationist sentiments in American society, a sluggish suspicion in regard to Russia, the budget deficit in the United States, and the unfavorable investment climate in Russia.

In the military-strategic sphere, the partnership which has begun, the creation of joint (and not "counterbalancing") instruments of ensuring security will, judging by all, encounter efforts by the right-wing conservative circles in the United States to ensure for themselves unilateral advantages in the process of disarmament, and to achieve a review of the ABM Treaty on their conditions. Evidently, cooperation in the sphere of conversion will not be formed easily, considering the lack of interest by the U.S. military-industrial complex in preserving the Russian military-technical potential. In cooperation with the United States on international problems, the conflict situations along the perimeter of the Russian borders will, most likely, come to the forefront. We cannot exclude efforts by the United States, under the guise of mediation and peacemaking efforts, to take Russia's place in the countries of its traditional influence.

Our active line in strengthening Russian-American ties, the precise fulfillment of our assumed responsibilities, and a businesslike manner in implementing coordinated plans will work in favor of neutralizing these phenomena and expanding in the United States the social base for the support of constructive tendencies in our relations, thereby strengthening the foundation of the long-term course for partnership with Russia.

Relying on the existing agreements in the military-political and financial-economic spheres, Russia will strive toward the stable development of relations with the United States, with a view toward strategic partnership, and in the future—toward alliance. At the same time, we must firmly oppose any possible recurrences of imperialist manifestations in Washington's policy, or any efforts to realize the policy of turning the United States into the "only superpower."

The absence of antagonistic contradictions in our relations with the United States does not mean a total absence of conflict. However, possible differences of opinion will not lead to confrontation if both countries proceed from the commonality of their long-term national interests and follow a realistic course.

With the ascent to power of a new administration in the United States, the main thing for us is not to allow a pause in our relations, to avoid the impression that Russian-American dialogue may develop in an "automatic mode." We must from the very beginning assume an active and assertive position, taking the initiative if possible, and fully addressing the realization of the "new agenda" in Russian-American interaction. The groundwork for this has already been created. This stems from the developed positive relations with the former American administration and was confirmed, specifically, in the course of the first personal contacts of the Russian Federation President with the newly elected U.S. President.

It is important to cultivate the policy which has been undertaken, keeping in mind that the expansion of interaction and the development of partnership should not only not erode the independent role of Russia or cause harm to its interests, but should be based on a strict consideration of our priorities. [Passage omitted]

In the sphere of security, the main trait of the new partnership is the transition to cooperation at the level of military planning and military construction. In solving specific problems (for example, the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, peacemaking operations), the integration of efforts by the defense complexes of Russia and the United States is justified.

We should implement the following steps in first-priority order: ensure conditions for the realization of the START I and START II Treaties; accelerate work on realistic parameters of a global defense system; bring the agreements on cooperation in the safe disposal of nuclear and chemical weapons onto a practical footing; agree on a mutual regimen of strict limits on the number and capacity of nuclear tests; propose to the Americans the development of a joint program of coordinated action for preventing the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and especially—potentially dangerous technologies. [Passage omitted]

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Further on Russian Discussion of START II

Foreign Policy Association Report

934C0040A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Mar 93 p 5

["Report of Foreign Policy Association (A.A. Bessmertnykh, President) on the Strategic, Economic, and Political Aspects of the Treaty Being Discussed at Hearings of the Russian Parliament: START II and Russia's National Interests"]

[Text] The end of the 40-year period of the cold war signifies the retreat into the past of the bipolar model of international politics, the basis of which was the military-strategic rivalry and mutual deterrence of the two nuclear superpowers—the USSR and the United States. A positive result of the collapse of bipolarity has been the appreciable lessening of the threat of a world nuclear war.

Bipolarity is gradually coming to be replaced by new international conditions with the leading role of several great powers, both traditional and new (Germany, Japan, India), and diverse interstate associations and organizations. Under the changed external and internal conditions Russia and the United States do not have the opportunities for continuation of the global rivalry. Nonetheless, the existence in them of enormous nuclear potentials imparts clearly expressed specifics to their relationship. Their nuclear arms will in the foreseeable period, given any agreements, be far superior to all the forces of third countries put together and will be directed mainly against one another, temporarily placing a strategic obstacle in the way of the formation of allied relations between them. At the same time, however, their exclusive position in the world in this respect creates for them a unique community of interests and views, and the new external and internal needs are forcing them to be partners, including in adopting measures pertaining to the radical reduction and limitation of the nuclear potentials.

The special relationship of the two states primarily in the sphere of strategic arms is contributing to the preservation for Russia of a most important place in international politics following the cold war, the strengthening of global military-political stability, and limitation of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology.

Following the disintegration of the USSR, in the course of the formation of Russian statehood, negotiations with the United States on the reduction and limitation of strategic arms not only were not suspended, as anticipated, but were stepped up sharply. They culminated in the signing on 3 January 1993 of the Treaty on a Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms or START II.

1. Basic Parameters of the START II Treaty

The immediate predecessor of the new agreement was the START I Treaty, work on which had taken almost 10 years,

signed by the presidents of the USSR and the United States in July 1991. The fact that the new START II Treaty was signed before the preceding one had taken effect and had come to be implemented by both parties was a phenomenon unique in international practice. In addition, the first phase of implementation of the new treaty covers the term of realization of the old one (up to the year 2,000 approximately). This is explained by the tumultuous changes of 1991-1992 and the fundamentally new demands of the times. The political realities taking shape here were reflected in ambivalent and largely contradictory fashion in specific parameters of the nuclear balance and also the conditions of the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

At the time that START I was signed the sides' strategic forces (in accordance with the agreed counting rules) looked as follows: the United States had 2,246 delivery systems (ground-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers—ICBMs, SLBMs, and HB [heavy bombers] respectively) and 10,563 nuclear weapons (ballistic missile and air-launched cruise missile warheads, in the main). The Soviet Union had more delivery systems (2,500) and, in view of the highly specific counting rules, almost as many (10,371) warheads, although in terms of the actual arming of the forces the United States' lead in terms of warheads constituted almost 30 percent.

In accordance with the START I Treaty, the parties undertook within a 7-year period to have reduced the total number of warheads on each side to 6,000 (thus according to the rules of counting, but in accordance with the arming which was actually possible, to approximately 8,000 for the United States, to 7,000 for the USSR), and the number of delivery systems here was not to have exceeded 1,600. The new treaty goes considerably further. Within the same timeframe it specifies a reduction in nuclear weapons to 3,800-4,250 (first stage), and all the arms of the heavy bombers here are now subject to counting (aerial bombs and air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 km were not previously subject to individual stock-taking). At the second stage the overall ceiling on nuclear weapons, given compliance with a number of conditions, could by 1 January 2003 have been lowered to 3,000-3,500. No additional limitation is fixed for delivery systems.

The START I Treaty fixed sublimits on the number of warheads on different types of weapons. Thus the sum total of warheads on sea-launched and ground-based ballistic missiles was not to have exceeded 4,900. The number of warheads on ground-mobile ICBMs was limited to no more than 1,100, and limits were placed on heavy ground-based missiles and their reentry vehicles (no more than 154 and 1,540 respectively). The latter limitations affected only the USSR (the SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBMs and the heavy SS-18 ICBMs)¹ inasmuch as the Americans do not have this class of missiles. The START II Treaty anticipates more radical measures: At the first stage all ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles are confined to a sublimit of 1,200 warheads, including no more than 650 on heavy missiles. At the second stage all multiple-warhead ICBMs, which constitute the basis of Russia's strategic offensive arms, are to be

eliminated completely, and only single-warhead (monobloc) ground-based missiles will be allowed.

Submarine-launched missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (the basis of the strategic potential of the United States) are not banned, but at the first stage the total number of SLBM warheads is confined to a sublimit of 2,160, at the second, 1,700-1,750. The previous treaty did not confine sea-launched missile forces to a separate sublimit.

As already observed, an important innovation of START II pertains to the aerial component of the nuclear triads, namely, the stock-taking of heavy bombers in terms of their real arming. Pertaining to the nuclear arms of heavy bombers here are not only long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) but also air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 km and free-fall nuclear bombs. This was absent from the START I Treaty, in accordance with which bombers with short-range missiles and bombs were counted as one nuclear weapon, and aircraft with ALCMs were counted as having 10 nuclear weapons, although they could actually carry up to 20 such missiles. The actual arming has been agreed upon, and the parties undertake not to increase it. The American side sought and won, for that matter, the permissible refitting of up to 100 nuclear heavy bombers, which had not been carriers of long-range ALCMs, into nonnuclear bombers, which must have distinctive characteristics observable by national technical means and by inspections.

Inasmuch as the START I and START II treaties are to be legally valid and are to be implemented practically simultaneously up to the year 2000, the following rule was adopted: What is not encompassed by the second treaty is regulated by the articles of the first, for START I constitutes the extensive treaty-legal foundation of START II. Specifically, the new treaty does not deal with the ban on the encoding of telemetric information at the time of new missile tests inasmuch as this most difficult question was agreed upon within the START I framework. Another such example is the limitation of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles to 880, which remains legally valid (although according to parties' unilateral initiatives announced in the fall of 1991, these systems, as well as the navies' tactical nuclear arms, are to be stood down from alert status).

A comparatively new and less complex and costly method of disarmament is the reduction in the number of warheads (downloading) on missiles with multiple reentry vehicles by means of the removal of several warheads. Provision was made for this procedure in the START I Treaty with a number of "protective" restrictions. The new treaty proceeded from the existence of far greater mutual trust, and for this reason these restrictions were relaxed considerably, although the right to download does not, as before, apply to heavy ICBMs.

2. Expenditures on the Reduction in Arms

It is obvious that the deep cuts in strategic forces connected with transporting and eliminating the missiles, launch silos, submarines, and bombers, warehousing thousands of warheads, and storing highly toxic rocket fuel will require substantial outlays. According to preliminary calculations,

over 10 years (that is, the timeframe of implementation of the START II Treaty) this will cost Russia approximately 40 billion rubles [R] (in 1992 prices). The realization of START I by the year 2000 would have cost less, although not by as much as might have been imagined, comparing the scale of the reductions—approximately R30 billion.

We would mention particularly that, compared with the plans within the START I framework, the majority of costly programs for modernizing the strategic forces have in the new context of the parties' strategic relationship been canceled or stopped in the early deployment phase. Just a few years ago the USSR had simultaneously in the deployment phase 13 main ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber, missile-firing submarine, and air- and sea-launched cruise missile systems. The United States had commissioned in parallel seven strategic systems. Now both sides have left themselves one system each: Russia is deploying the light single-warhead ground-mobile SS-25 (RS-12M Topol) ICBMs, and the United States is continuing the construction of Ohio-class submarines with the Trident-2 SLBM. Expenditure on the elimination of the arms will be compensated to a considerable extent by economies thanks to the cancellation of these programs and a reduction in the operating costs of the remaining forces (without the reductions in strategic offensive arms operating expenditure in the decade would constitute no less than R300 billion).

Account needs to be taken also of the fact that Russia would, in any event, have had to eliminate more than 50 percent of the missiles, aircraft, and submarines destined to be scrapped in accordance with START II on account of their physical aging and wear and tear. Their replacement by new generations within the START I framework would have been impossible due to Russia's grim economic situation and the breakdown of industrial cooperation (two out of the three plants manufacturing the latest ICBMs, for example, are located in Ukraine). The organization of the production of such systems in Russia would have required enormous outlays and would have taken a long time. The deep cuts specified by the START II Treaty relax the need for this replacement. In addition, according to the Lisbon agreements of May 1992, all strategic arms outside of Russia, and such in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus constitute 27 percent in terms of warheads, are to be eliminated whatever the circumstances. This includes the latest systems constituting approximately half the weapons deployed outside of Russia.

In this sense the START II Treaty will help Russia accomplish a considerable portion of the reductions and spare it modernization programs, which are currently beyond its capacity, not unilaterally, leaving the growing superiority of the United States, but on a reciprocal basis, in the context of bilateral reductions in and limitations of strategic forces. How far these measures are balanced and equal is an ambivalent and exceptionally complex question.

3. Correlation of Mutual Concessions

Granted all the complexity and diversity of the strategic assessments, the essence of the START II exchange (taking START I as the point of departure) is very simple. The

United States has for the first time agreed to limit sea-launched nuclear forces—the main component of the American triad—which account for 55 percent of nuclear weapons. The sublimit fixed for them of 1,700-1,750 warheads is three times lower than the current number and half as many as provided for by the START I Treaty. Another important concession of the United States is the fact that the nuclear armament of heavy bombers is for the first time counted in accordance with the actual arming, not in accordance with an arbitrary coefficient, as in the START I Treaty. This coefficient understated by almost 4,000 nuclear weapons the actual number of American ALCM, short-range missiles, and aerial bombs, thus removing them from the overall quantitative limit.

Further, in view of the ban on multiple-warhead ICBMs, 50 of the most sophisticated American MX (Peacekeeper) missiles with 500 warheads possessing, in view of the combination of power and accuracy of the reentry vehicles, the greatest capacity for destroying highly protected targets of the other side (ICBM silos, command posts) will be stood down. On 500 Minuteman III ICBMs the number of warheads will be reduced from 1,500 to 500 (that is, from three to one per missile).

However, for Russia the condition concerning the complete elimination of and the ban on ground-based ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles will have even greater strategic, operational, and technical-economic consequences. This is, essentially, Moscow's main concession in exchange for the above-mentioned Washington concessions. Ground-based missiles were traditionally the lead and most important component of the Soviet strategic forces. Approximately 60 percent of strategic weapons was concentrated on multiple-warhead ICBMs (in the United States, less than 19 percent, according to the START I counting rules).

Moscow has to make a difficult decision in this connection: to preserve the traditional orientation toward ground-based ICBMs and move toward a more extensive and costly deployment of single-warhead ICBMs than had been planned earlier or undertake a radical restructuring of the triad and switch to a new force structure reminiscent of the Americans. The second path—a reduction in the proportion of the lead component of the triad from 60 percent to 15 percent, say—would run counter to the existing strategic concepts, operational plans, and possibilities of the command and control systems and would be contrary to the notions of parity, stability, and sufficiency.

4. Stability and Sufficiency

The evolved strategic notions are objectively conditioned and explicable to a considerable extent. In the light of the geostrategic location and technical problems, a shift of the main emphasis to the sea- and air-based components of the triad would seem for Russia, as distinct from the United States, unacceptable.

At the same time the preservation inviolate of the former role, operational-strategic principles, and composition of the ICBMs is also undesirable, and impossible too. Having formerly deployed almost 7,000 warheads on 1,400 ICBMs, mainly with multiple reentry vehicles and stationary (silo)

basing, the Soviet command planned a massive strike against the strategic forces and industrial centers of the United States. The main concept here was the retaliatory-counter strike, that is, the missiles were to have been launched without waiting for the enemy's reentry vehicles (presumably launched on a preemptive attack) to have reached their targets on the territory of the USSR. The lead role of the silo-based ICBMs was closely connected with this.

In the years of the cold war and the rigid military confrontation reliance on a counterstrike strategy was, in any event, explicable. Now, when both sides are pulling back from the brink of war, remaining within the framework of the old strategy would be unwarranted. A reorientation of the strategic plans, command and control systems, and military organizational development toward the concept of a purely retaliatory strike is essential. A counterlaunch could remain merely as a backup, "insurance" concept.

The START II Treaty does not prevent and in certain most important parameters facilitates a multilevel restructuring of military policy and military organizational development. In fact, a departure from the concepts and forces of both a preemptive and counter strike, from plans for a disarming attack, from the absurdly high criteria of the infliction of damage and, consequently, from the policy of nuclear blackmail—all this should constitute the changing essence of the strategic relationship of Russia and the United States under the new political conditions. They are still objectively a long way from allied relations, but the two powers are capable of ceasing to be mutually distrustful nuclear rivals and of formulating a partner relationship for preventing nuclear war and assuring strategic stability.

At the most general level the authors of the report believe that it would be sufficient for Russia to have within the START II framework 800-900 single-warhead ICBMs, including 60 percent on mobile launchers. Silo-based missiles with launch-on-warning capability would perform here the role of insurance for mobile systems requiring time for operational deployment. Within the 1,700-1,750 warhead sublimit there could remain 23-25 comparatively new submarines with 390-420 partially downloaded SLBMs.

Adequate capital investments should be made in the warning and command and control and communications systems (including super-protected command posts), which it is best to create on the basis of the technical groundwork and under the integrated operational control of the strategic missile forces. It is possible that certain prospects for cooperation with the United States in the space-based monitoring and warning of missile launches will be afforded.

The transition to such a structure and levels of the potential of a rational retaliatory strike as a whole fits within the START II framework. But in certain aspects, in the opinion of the authors of the report, the treaty could contribute to a greater extent to stability and also to the restructuring of Russia's strategic forces with minimal outlays.

Specifically, Russia has grounds, it would seem, to insist on a narrower overall limit on nuclear weapons. Aside from

everything else, this would reduce the need for the deployment of single-warhead ICBMs. Further, consent to the elimination of the rail-mobile SS-24 missiles was justified inasmuch as their service life expires shortly after the year 2003, and the maintenance is now dependent on Ukraine. But provision should be made here, it would seem, for the possibility in principle of the creation in the future of light mobile missiles with multiple reentry vehicles with a limited number of warheads (three to four). From the viewpoint of strategic stability they are no more dangerous than the multiple-warhead sea-based missiles permitted in accordance with the treaty, but they would be for Russia a highly economical weapon within the body of strategic offensive arms.

It is hard to agree with the limits on the number of multiple-warhead ICBM's which may be refitted as single-warhead ICBMs. It is prohibited to refit the SS-24 missiles in both the mobile and stationary versions, and it is permitted to download the SS-19 missiles only in a quantity of 105. There is also an excessively strict limitation on the number of SS-18 heavy ICBM silos which may be refitted (90 silos). The downloading of a large number of missiles and an increase in the number of silos which may be refitted to at least 150 would reduce expenditure on the deployment of stationary single-warhead missiles by approximately 25 percent. This would be to the benefit of the United States also, incidentally, inasmuch as the downloaded existing Russian missiles would have 25 percent less efficiency in a first strike than the new ones, but their retaliatory strike stabilizing potential, on the other hand, would be 15 percent higher.

The noted and other deficiencies of START II (these also include, for example, curiosities like the meaningless "forks" in the limits and sublimits inasmuch as the parties may have both fewer and greater forces than the lower limit, but do not have the right to exceed the upper limit) do not void its overall positive significance and testify rather to shortcomings of the process of the formulation and implementation of policy in the Russian leadership.

5. The New Treaty and the CIS

The strategic offensive arms of the former USSR are deployed on the territory of four republics: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. A significant part—approximately one-fourth of the ICBMs, one-third of the ICBM warheads, and more than three-fourths of the arms of the heavy bombers—is located outside of Russia.

In particular, 130 silo-based SS-19 ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles (each missile carries six warheads) and 46 SS-24 ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles (each missile carries 10 warheads) are deployed in Ukraine. Thus the republic has altogether 176 ICBMs, which account for 1,240 warheads. In addition, 40 heavy bombers fitted for nuclear arms (approximately 400 nuclear warheads) are based in Ukraine.

In connection with the START I Treaty the United States together with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus signed a protocol to this treaty in Lisbon on 23 May 1992. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine undertook to guarantee

in the context of START I the elimination of all offensive strategic arms deployed on their territory within 7 years, that is, by the year 2000 approximately, and also to subscribe "as soon as possible" to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as states not possessing nuclear weapons. The START II Treaty does not impose on them additional obligations.

On 4 November 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation ratified the START I Treaty. At the same time the decree of the Supreme Soviet adopted in connection with ratification of the treaty stipulates that Russia will exchange instruments of ratification with the United States after Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have subscribed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. On 4 February 1993 the Supreme Soviet of Belarus ratified the START I Treaty and adopted the decision to subscribe to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Kazakhstan also has ratified START I, an inalienable part of which is the Lisbon Protocol. This question has yet to be settled in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, even given the most propitious course of affairs (including Ukraine's ratification of START I and the Lisbon Protocol), the timescale of the elimination of the strategic weapons outside of Russia would seem unjustifiably prolonged. Seven years is too long a period given the current instability of the situation within the CIS states and in relations between them. The status and questions of the command and control and elimination (utilization) of the nuclear weapons could themselves serve as a pretext for an exacerbation of contradictions in the CIS and an object of political speculation and the provocations of nationalist groupings.

Supplementary to the Lisbon agreements within the START I framework it would seem necessary in the context of compliance with START II to attempt to negotiate the accelerated and economical standdown (in 1993) of missiles from the effective force levels by way of the complete decoupling of the warheads with the assurance of adequate methods of supervision and guarantees for all interested parties. Technical measures (specifically, the production and installation of simulation devices) would make it possible to maintain, in accordance with the time limit, 176 "decapitated" missiles in Ukraine and 104 ICBMs in Kazakhstan until the time for their elimination according to the treaty schedule arrives (the missiles in Belarus are not being eliminated but redeployed to Russia).

To prevent discrimination in respect to the said two republics similar measures within a minimum timeframe could be applied to the missiles with multiple reentry vehicles which are to be eliminated at the first stage of the START II Treaty.

Maintenance of a stable strategic balance demands that the United States also undertake the accelerated decoupling and supervised warehousing of a comparable number of warheads of the Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, and other missiles. From this viewpoint consideration should be given to such a measure as the location of all nuclear arms of heavy bombers of the United States and the Russian Federation

and on the territory of Kazakhstan and Ukraine at centralized dumps under the mutual supervision of Russia and the United States.

6. START II and Third Nuclear Countries

Despite the fact that the START II Treaty has encountered approval on the part of Britain, France, and China, it is hardly to be expected that these countries, which adhere to a strategy of "minimum" nuclear deterrence, will subscribe to the radical measures of Russia and the United States any time soon. The period of realization of the START II Treaty is very long, and the nuclear potentials of Russia and the United States on the one hand and of third countries on the other are as yet incommensurable. At the present time the number of nuclear warheads on delivery systems of the PRC, Britain, and France which correspond to the categories of weapons of START I and START II constitute in toto fewer than 700 (that is, less than seven percent of the potentials on strategic delivery systems of Russia or the United States). True, third countries have intermediate-range and tactical delivery systems, but their consideration would require the incorporation of thousands of warheads on similar systems of the two leading powers.

A polemic is flaring up around this entire problem. In the opinion of the authors of the report, implementation of the cuts in accordance with the START II Treaty does not represent a danger to Russia, even if third nuclear powers have not yet renounced the planned programs of modernization of their forces. By the year 2003 Britain, France, and China may have altogether, at the most, up to 1,300-1,500 nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems, that is, approximately 30-40 percent of the potential of each principal nuclear power. Russia may, additionally, keep no fewer weapons on intermediate and tactical airborne delivery systems sufficient from the geographical viewpoint for safeguarding its national security.

Equating Russia's nuclear forces (as, previously, the Soviet forces) with the aggregate might of the other four powers is highly improper in both the political and military respects, unless Russia is intent on opposing them all simultaneously, and it has no such intention. Provided that Russia retains sufficient potential for deterring the United States, it will, if necessary, have sufficient force for deterring the other nuclear powers also.

Third countries will, most likely, be in no hurry to subscribe to the process of a reduction in nuclear arms at least through the end of the period of realization of the START II Treaty. But their modernization programs may very well be slowed down or reduced in scale even (in terms, for example, of the number of warheads on the SLBMs of Britain and France) under the conditions of the compliance by Russia and the United States with their treaty commitments.

Subsequent deeper cuts by Russia and the United States, which could be the subject of subsequent negotiations, will require a limitation of the forces of third countries, of France and Britain, in any event. And they would, evidently, agree to this, although by way of unilateral rather than treaty commitments. This would also depend on a number of other circumstances: on, for example, a solution

of the question of the strategic arms of the former Soviet Union deployed outside of Russia and on the state of affairs concerning the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology and also on the policy of Russia and the United States in the sphere of antimissile defenses.

7. START II and the ABM Treaty

As we all know, for just over the past 20 years the ABM Treaty has been the sole long-term arms control agreement, erected on a legal basis, between the two leading nuclear powers. But a highly ambivalent attitude has come to be displayed toward the ABM Treaty in Russia of late in connection with the positive changes in Russian-American relations. However paradoxical, both the president and a number of official leaders and experts are simultaneously advocating both support for continuation of the ABM Treaty and the creation of a "global Russian-American system of protection against ballistic missiles."

The authors of the report believe that if a defensive system for protection against potential ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction in the hands of "third world dictators" is necessary, the creation of a system for the accomplishment of the said tasks is, obviously, needed. Namely, a sophisticated tactical mobile ABM system for intercepting Scud-class operational-tactical missiles in regional theaters. Such a system (parallel or joint) would not be contrary to the ABM Treaty, although it would require a certain clarification of a number of its provisions. The creation and joint operation of a system for monitoring outer space and warning of missile launches would also at the current stage be quite useful for Russia and the United States.

The START II Treaty does not abolish but, on the contrary, enshrines at lower ceilings the balance of the mutual capacity for a limited but adequate response to hypothetical nuclear aggression. The concept of strategic stability fully concurring with the logic of the ABM Treaty is embodied here. But it would be contradicted by plans for parallel or "joint" ground- and space-based ABM systems (which represent, incidentally, the slightly modified technical groundwork of the times of the cold war).

It would seem that the interconnection of the new treaty with the preservation of the ABM Treaty is expressed insufficiently clearly and unequivocally in the preamble to START II. Clearer confirmation of the relationship between a deep cut in offensive arms and compliance with the ABM Treaty, as two inseparable aspects of strategic stability for the foreseeable period, should be recorded. This would not impede a decision on the creation of a joint strategic ABM system were the United States and Russia to reach such a decision in the more distant future. By definition, if the ABM system is a joint one, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty or its revision would be concerted.

For economic and political reasons the United States' transition to a unilateral deployment of ground- and space-based ABM defenses is practically ruled out in the foreseeable period. But the deep cuts in accordance with START II, at the next stage even more, and the limitation of the

potentials of third nuclear countries will require greater certainty in respect to antimissile systems.

Conclusion

On the whole, the START II Treaty is a major step in the right direction. Its main merit is the considerable reduction in the possibility of a disarming first strike (both American and Russian) and a radical reduction in nuclear arms given the preservation of sufficient potentials for retribution in a retaliatory strike. The treaty affords Russia an opportunity to reduce the burden of the maintenance of deterrent forces.

Although the treaty is not without deficiencies and contentious provisions, its ratification would open the way to further supplementary and rectifying steps. The precedent for this was created by the START II Treaty itself, which developed and extended START I, which had been concluded earlier, superimposing itself on the latter to the extent of 70 percent in terms of timeframe of implementation. On the other hand, if the treaty is rejected, this would break off the Russian-American dialogue, predetermine a general destabilization of the nuclear balance and, most of all, entail a serious degradation of Russia's strategic position.

We consider it expedient, therefore, that the treaty be ratified by the Supreme Soviet and that immediately after this a proposal be sent to the United States for the commencement of negotiations on START III. The agenda of the new negotiations should include the elaboration of additional measures which equalize and stabilize the Russia-United States strategic relationship even more. Such measures and tasks could be recorded specially in resolutions of the Supreme Soviet accompanying the ratification of START II.

It could primarily be proposed that the new U.S. Administration negotiate a lowering of the overall ceiling on each side's strategic forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads. This, in particular, would enable Russia to reduce spending on the construction of new single-warhead ICBMs while preserving the leading role of the strategic missile forces in the strategic triad.

It is necessary to negotiate stricter and irreversible limitations on multiple-warhead SLBMs (a similar approach to the stabilizing ground-mobile ICBM systems is justified here) and also on the elimination of sea-launched cruise missiles. The balance would be even more stable, and the possibility of a disarming strike would be eliminated conclusively. Conditions conducive to the inclusion of third nuclear powers in the negotiations in this form or the other would take shape.

It might in this context be possible to agree on new methods of the accelerated and economical standdown of part of the forces from the effective force levels—by way of the complete de-mating of the warheads from the ICBMs and the removal of the arms from airborne delivery systems, given their centralized warehousing with the assurance of appropriate mutual supervision. Such measures would simultaneously remove the danger of the disintegration of the

nuclear legacy of the USSR and contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In connection with the stockpiling of large quantities of warheads at warehouses and to exclude their reverse reloading on delivery systems a new and exceptionally important sphere of negotiations could be the dismantling of the nuclear munitions and the conversion of fissionable material, the legalization of an end to the production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, and a supervised freeze on the production of nuclear munitions.

In the light of deeper cuts a strengthening of the ABM Treaty together with agreements on the joint development of tactical ABM systems and missile-launch warning systems would be necessary. In view of the increase on both sides in the relative significance of the submarine component, the question of the limitation of antisubmarine defenses for imparting greater survivability to the submarine forces should be raised separately.

In a word, pauses, protracted ones particularly, would not correspond to the national interests of Russia or the United States. The START II Treaty should be seen as an important, but far from final, stage of the Russian-American strategic dialogue.

The report was prepared by the following associates of the Foreign Policy Association Center for Disarmament and Strategic Stability: A.G. Arbatov (leader), A.N. Kalyadin, G.K. Lednev, O.A. Amirov, A.S. Kozlova, V.I. Vladimirov.

Footnote

1. Here and subsequently the identification of the weapons systems is made in accordance with the American identification to avoid confusion in the standard designations

Article on Benefits of Treaty

PM3003130193 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No. 12, Mar 93 (signed to press 16 Mar 93) pp 28-29

[Igor Sutyagin article: "How Many Nuclear Weapons Does Russia Need. START II Treaty: Step Forward or Step Into Abyss?"]

[Text] After Presidents Boris Yeltsin and George Bush signed the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START II Treaty), fierce controversy began in our country over how to assess this event—as an historic breakthrough to a glorious future or as an act of supreme betrayal of national interests? The dispute involves generals, scientists, democrats, the opposition, patriots, and Westernists.

This dispute became particularly trenchant after the parliamentary hearings on the treaty began in the Russian Supreme Soviet. It is thought that it will take parliamentarians about 2 months to come to a final decision either to ratify the treaty, despite its enemies' views, or to reject it.

The Stores Will Not Be Empty

Russia and the United States agreed to cut back their strategic nuclear forces by 1 January 2003 so that the total number of nuclear warheads on deployed intercontinental

ballistic missiles [ICBMs], submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], and heavy bombers would not exceed 3,500 units.

That notwithstanding MIRV'ed ICBMs must be destroyed, with the exception of no more than 105 such missiles of a single type, transformed into single-warhead missiles. These missiles must be sited in the launchers they were in at the time that the previous START I Treaty was signed.

In practice this means that the treaty authorizes 105 RS-18 (known in the West as SS-19) missile systems to be retained in the arsenal of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. These systems currently carry six warheads each. Each system will be left with one warhead. The treaty especially stipulates that there is no need to destroy the removed warheads' standard [shtatnyy] platforms. That is the remaining RS-18s retain room to accommodate another five warheads. The same applies to submarines, the number of whose warheads is also to be cut back.

The treaty especially stipulates a commitment to eliminate all so-called "heavy" missiles, these being our RS-20s, widely known by the Western designation of SS-18. Some 90

launchers can be kept provided they are converted into single-warhead missile launchers.

As of 1 January 2003, in accordance with the treaty, the total number of warheads sited on SLBMs must not exceed 1,700-1,750 units.

The fact that the total number of warheads includes **all** nuclear charges mounted on heavy bombers **without exception**—be they the latest long-range cruise missile or an obsolete gravity bomb—is an important element in the treaty.

Thus, as a result of the implementation of the START II Treaty, a structure for the sides' strategic nuclear forces could take shape, one possible version of which is depicted below.

Naturally, the table below does not necessarily depict the optimum or the only version possible. For instance, Russia might deploy a larger number of RS-12M missiles—either mobile or silo-launched—and make fuller use of the permitted quota of 3,500 warheads. The United States might in the future stop keeping ground-launched ICBMs in its arsenal, then 96 nuclear-equipped B-1B heavy bombers and up to 67 B-52Hs could be kept in the arsenal.

Russia	United States
ICBMs	
105 RS-18s	500 Minutemen-3
350 mobile RS-12Ms	
300 silo-launched RS-12Ms	
SLBMs	
6 Typhoon submarines (1,200 warheads on 120 SLBMs)	18 Ohio submarines (1,728 warheads on 432 SLBMs)
7 Kalmar submarines (336 warheads on 112 SLBMs)	
4 Delfin submarines (192 warheads on 64 SLBMs)	
Heavy Bombers	
80 TU-95MSs (480 warheads)	20 B-2s (80 warheads)
20 Tu-160s (240 warheads)	75 B-1Bs (900 warheads)
	36 B-52Hs (288 warheads)
Total	
3,203 warheads	3,496 warheads
(1,151 carriers)	(1,078 carriers)

How Can America Be Turned Into Africa?

Opponents of the START II Treaty claim that it undermines the might of our national strategic deterrence forces, leaving Russia defenseless in the face of overwhelming U.S. superiority.

I would not want to repeat facts that are well-known, but back in 1990-91 the General Staff, in conjunction with the relevant branches of the armed forces, conducted a detailed study of the question of the maximum permissible level of cuts in the then Soviet strategic nuclear forces, a level that would not increase the danger for the USSR or increase uncertainty when planning to deter potential aggressors. The magic number is perfectly well-known—2,500 warheads.

Undoubtedly, people obsessed with a certain political stance will reject from the outset the justice of this assessment. However, you can only argue with people who are willing to accept their opponent's arguments—otherwise it is no argument, but a crude squabble. It therefore seems productive to try to evaluate the possible consequences arising from Russia's using the number of warheads to be retained following the implementation of the START II Treaty.

The point is that the most vehement enemies of the treaty seriously underestimate the vulnerability of a modern industrially-developed state in the event of nuclear weapons' being employed and overestimate the counterforce potential of nuclear arms. The calculations carried out by certain specialists do, however, show that the destruction

of just 57-65 installations from the military infrastructure on U.S. territory would deprive the United States for at least 5-10 years of the chance of resuming production of certain key categories of modern weapons, heavy transport aircraft, and so on.

Destroying or merely inflicting serious damage on the reactors at 68 nuclear power stations operating in the United States would render about 195,000-430,000 square km totally unfit for habitation for several decades.

This result, terrible per se, would have catastrophic consequences for the U.S. economy: Some 49 nuclear power stations are located on the eastern seaboard and in the Mid-West, and the industrial regions of the Atlantic seaboard and the Great Lakes would end up in an area dangerous for habitation. Florida would cease to be a resort area—it would begin to be reminiscent of the dead area around Chernobyl. For the same reason New York would lose its reputation as the financial capital of the world. The destruction of just one terminal in the Alaskan port of Valdez would deprive the United States for several years of 30 percent of the oil used in the continental United States. And there are after all also chemical enterprises and major reservoirs on U.S. territory.

In order for this apocalyptic picture to take shape, 200-270 warheads have to be delivered to U.S. territory. Given the level of the strategic nuclear forces prescribed by the START II Treaty that quantity of nuclear warheads—or even more—could certainly be delivered to targets in North America even in the worst case scenario for the Russian Army.

What if the Americans Strike First?

That would, for instance, be the case if the U.S. forces delivered a first strike against Russian nuclear weapons while they were in daily alert status, that is without raising the strategic forces' level of readiness, something that could be detected in advance.

Second, if all the targets on Russian territory were attacked by the Americans simultaneously and the surviving Russian missiles only began to be launched once the U.S. attack was completely over. But in practice that scenario has no chance of being carried out since some of the attacking missiles would be detected in advance due to the different flight times to targets located at different distances. Clearly, Russian missiles would start to be launched in retaliation from the more remote regions immediately after the attack on the "closest" Russian targets.

In every case the number of nuclear warheads that would reach U.S. territory would be considerably higher than 200-270. As a result the United States would for at least 10-15 years be put in a position that is not even comparable to the position of today's developing African countries.

All that, I think, gives grounds to say that, even if the START II Treaty still bears the mark of the "cold war," it is a step in the right direction, since it removes an unjustifiably plentiful supply of the "megadeath" that both the USSR (now Russia) and the United States took years to stockpile for "use" on the territory of the "most likely

adversary" should the need arise. If the treaty is ratified, there will be more common sense in international relations. Saying that the START II Treaty destroys Russia's ability to check possible aggressive actions against it, is somewhat awkward...

Present Supreme Soviet 'Will Not Ratify'

LD2303162993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Mar 93 First Edition p 3

[Konstantin Eggert report: "The Ratification of START-II Could Fall Through, Unless Deputies Change Their Point of View"]

[Text] "The present Supreme Soviet will not ratify START II"—this was how a high-ranking functionary in the president's entourage commented on the postponement of the parliamentary hearings on this question announced on Monday [22 March].

This opinion on the whole coincides with the view of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Council, who are conducting an active but, it would appear, unproductive explanatory campaign among deputies. Both groups note a marked hardening of the position of parliamentarians—including members of the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations—with regard to START II.

According to information from informed sources in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the implacable opposition is seeking to drag out the discussion of the treaty, hoping to come to power and bury it once and for all. At the same time supporters of the moderate opposition will endeavor to rewrite certain articles during the debates. "Juridically speaking, this is irregular," an authoritative diplomat stated to IZVESTIYA. "During discussion it is possible to specify the interpretation of various points, but to change them is impossible. That requires new talks."

A well-informed Security Council staffer remarked that the nonacceptance of the treaty has become a kind of banner for deputies disposed against the president. They see START II in a purely internal political context. "There is not, nor can there be, a single serious argument against it," the Security Council spokesman said. He rejected as unfounded the arguments that START II changes the structure of the nuclear forces in our country while leaving it unchanged in the United States: "It is not a question of structure. The most important thing is that Russia's security will be reliably safeguarded even with 2,500 warheads" (let us recall that the treaty establishes a final figure for warheads in the following ratio: 3,000 to Russia, 3,500 to the United States).

The same high-ranking Security Council official said that the Council's experts assess the agreement positively. "However, the Security Council has not yet discussed this question," he remarked. "Let us wait until the relevant session is held."

**Defense Committee Chairman Suggests
Postponing Hearings**

OW0504170093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1619 GMT 5 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The chairman of Russia's Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security Issues Sergey Stepashin thinks it wise to discontinue further parliamentary hearings on the ratification of the Russo-American START II treaty signed in Moscow on 3 January 1993 until the April 25 referendum. In an interview given to "Interfax" S. Stepashin underlined that, bearing in mind the situation that resulted from the Ninth Congress of People's Deputies, one may suggest that renewing the hearings might awaken political forces that oppose the ratification of the Treaty and may want to use it for propaganda purposes during the preparation for the referendum.

Prior to renewing the parliamentary hearings on the issue, said Stepashin, a series of consultations between the Russian parliamentarians and their colleagues from the U.S. Congress has to be conducted. These meetings, previously scheduled for April, clearly cannot take place earlier than May, stressed S. Stepashin.

Further on Ukrainian Discussion of START I

Foreign Ministry Statement on Talks With Russia

934K0639A Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
11 Mar 93 p 3

["Report of the Press Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine"]

[Text] The press center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine disseminated a statement of Yuriy Kostenko, head of the Ukrainian delegation for negotiations with the Russian Federation delegation and minister of environmental protection. In particular, the statement says:

On 5 March the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, despite an agreement at the level of the heads of the delegation not to publicize divergences that appeared in the course of negotiations, disseminated a report concerning the negotiations between the delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on a wide circle of questions connected with nuclear arms located on the territory of Ukraine.

In conjunction with the fact that this report contains a unilateral and unrealistic interpretation of the sense and subject of the negotiations, of problem areas that must be resolved by them, and of the very course of the negotiations, I consider it necessary to state the following.

FIRST. Negotiations with the Russian Federation concerning questions of providing for nuclear and ecological security of strategic forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine were proposed by the Ukrainian party back at the beginning of last year. The Russian party consistently avoided a detailed discussion of the question of holding them. The Russian party took 2 months to respond to the last appeal of the Ukrainian party on this subject. At the same time, the Russian structures responsible for nuclear

and ecological security of the nuclear warheads were deliberately not carrying out mandated work to provide for their reliable and problem-free use. The goal of this position is quite clear and was openly stated at the last round of negotiations in Moscow: to compel Ukraine to acknowledge the Strategic Nuclear Forces on its territory as being Russian.

SECOND. The first and second rounds of negotiations demonstrated the readiness of experts of both parties to come to agreement, especially with regard to the search for specific mechanisms acceptable to Ukraine and the Russian Federation for the use of nuclear materials that remain after destruction of the nuclear weapon. Achievement of agreement is hindered by the political stance of the delegation of the Russian Federation concerning fundamental questions of ownership of components of the nuclear weapons and concerning the status of the Strategic Nuclear Forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine.

THIRD. The main divergences in the positions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation at the negotiations consist of the fact that Ukraine cannot, as a result of principled considerations, consent to the stationing of foreign forces on its territory, while the Russian Federation insists on precisely that.

A second main divergence consists of the fact that the Russian party is trying to compel Ukraine to repudiate its ownership rights over the nuclear components of arms located on its territory as one of the successors of the former USSR, as defined by the Lisbon protocol and other documents.

FOURTH. An extremely serious problem at the negotiations is the question of the right of ownership and further use of nuclear materials remaining from tactical warheads shipped out of the territory of Ukraine for dismantling and destruction in the Russian Federation in the spring of 1992. Ukraine never repudiated its right of ownership of those materials and insists on a resolution of the question of their use together with the question of the use of the strategic warheads. The Russian delegation is ignoring this justifiable demand of the Ukrainian party, citing the instructions of its political leadership, and this, of course, has affected the atmosphere of the negotiations.

FIFTH. The tendency of the Russian party to use the mass media to achieve its true goals was also apparent to all after the first round of negotiations. It was no accident that the article "A Second Chernobyl Is Nearing in the Missile Silos of Ukraine" appeared in IZVESTIYA. After the second round of negotiations the Russian party disseminated the aforementioned tendentious and one-sided statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

SIXTH. Since June 1992 the Ukrainian party has been proposing to the Russian party that negotiations be held to compose a Memorandum concerning a distribution of the limits and restrictions established by the START Treaty on strategic offensive arms of the former Soviet Union. The achievement of such an agreement between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine is stipulated by Article 2 of the Lisbon protocol, and the Ukrainian party has been prepared

to hold the corresponding negotiations on a four-party basis. Any other decisions have demonstrated lack of respect toward other sovereign states. The Russian delegation has insisted strictly on a bilateral discussion of a text of the Memorandum proposed by it despite the fact that the latter stipulates signatures of the four states.

SEVENTH. The Ukrainian party is prepared to continue negotiations in a constructive spirit toward the speediest possible conclusion of the appropriate agreements. These agreements must provide for effective technical servicing of and oversight of the principals over strategic nuclear arms located both in Ukraine and in the Russian Federation, resolve questions of the subsequent use of all components of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, and ensure the normal functioning of the Strategic Nuclear Forces stationed in Ukraine.

Deputy Alignments on Ratification

934K0638A Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
11 Mar 93 p 3

[Article by Ukrainian People's Deputy M. Balandyuk under the "Politics" rubric: "Opinion of a Deputy: Nationalism or State Rationalism"]

[Text] Over recent months there have appeared in the near and distant foreign press many articles concerning the position of Ukraine with regard to nuclear arms.

The article "Nationalism and Nuclear Arms" printed on 12 November 1992 in the American newspaper CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR united the most characteristic themes of such articles.

This article groundlessly accuses Ukraine of threatening European stability by saying that the Supreme Soviet is sabotaging ratification of the START-1 Treaty while the Ukrainian army holds the government and the economy in an iron grasp, etc.

One might not pay any particular attention to such articles if the situation within the borders of the former USSR were not so alarming and the process of creation of the state in Ukraine were not so difficult. On one hand all of this misleads the West with regard to the situation in Ukraine and, on the other hand, Ukraine becomes the target of blackmail and deliberate pressure in the very process of the resolution of questions which require peace, consideration, and precise calculation.

The essence of the problem, as everyone knows, is the elimination of strategic arms without harming the national security of Ukraine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine effectively became the third state in the world in terms of size of its nuclear arsenal (after the United States and Russia). On our territory there are 1,656 nuclear warheads situated on 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Each of the latter is capable of delivering up to 10 individually targeted nuclear warheads. We also have 30 strategic bombers with an arsenal of 500 cruise missiles and heavy nuclear bombs.

According to specialists, in terms of its level this missile potential is the latest word in world missile construction. Of

the 176 missiles, 46 are solid-fueled. It will take 10-15 years for such missiles to appear in the arsenal of the Pentagon. Twenty-six of the 176 missiles are subject to modernization or removal from alert status in the immediate future as a result of the expiration of their term of utilization.

The first stage of massed pressure on Ukraine began at the end of 1992. It was caused by two main factors: The signing of the START-2 Treaty, which can only be implemented under condition of the ratification of the START-1 Treaty by Ukraine; and the desire of the former administration of the White House and especially the attempt of President Bush to achieve as many points as possible prior to the elections as the architect of an unprecedented reduction in nuclear arms.

Are there grounds for accusing Ukraine of holding up the worldwide process of nuclear arms reduction?

To begin with, unfortunately no such worldwide process exists any longer. Only the United States and the USSR had taken part in it, whereas Russia, China, Great Britain, and France have never stated that they wish to undertake any reduction in their nuclear arsenals.

Despite the existence over many years of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the arms have spread across the world fairly quickly. As serious sources of information (the foreign intelligence service of Russia, etc.) show, in addition to the officially nuclear states there are three other blocs of states. To the first bloc belong countries which unofficially possess nuclear arms. They number about five to seven. The second bloc contains several threshold states. The third bloc consists of those close to the threshold. In other words, those which have made the appropriate political decisions at the state level to create nuclear weapons but do not yet possess the necessary potential for their production.

Ukraine, as defined in its documents, does not intend to be a nuclear state in the future. Moreover, in an extremely short period of time it has, on its own initiative, disposed of tactical nuclear arms.

At present there exist in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine three approaches to a resolution of the nuclear problem.

The first approach. This approach is supported by the smallest number of deputies. It can be expressed by the following formula: We need to ratify the treaty without any restrictions and as soon as possible. In conjunction with the fact that we have neither the necessary technology nor the personnel for oversight, our arms are not intercontinental nuclear missiles but rather nuclear mines. Therefore the sooner we can dispose of them, the better it will be for Ukraine and the world. This idea is the most acceptable to the West and to Russia. To a certain degree it creates for Ukraine the most favorable conditions for realization of its foreign and domestic policy. It undoubtedly elevates the status of Ukrainian state officials and the authority of Ukraine. But this idea does not at all take into account the catastrophic state of our economy and our poverty. Nor does it take into account the fact that nuclear arms are a

very great material and military resource which even very rich states will not relinquish free of charge.

The second approach. This one is supported by a significant number of people's deputies. It is characterized by the following formula: Ukraine must declare itself a nuclear state, because ratification of START-1 would be a crime against the Ukrainian people. At a time when dozens of states for whom the threat of aggression is no greater than for Ukraine are developing programs for the creation of nuclear arms, expending millions and billions of dollars for this purpose, Ukraine would be voluntarily giving up its arms and reducing its defense capability to nothing.

But this approach would lead to a speedy enlightenment, because immediately after Ukraine declared itself a nuclear power it would find itself in the grip of a political and perhaps economic blockade on the part of the West.

Without doubt, Ukrainian scholars and builders of missiles are no less talented than those in other countries. They are capable of developing a domestic nuclear industry. But dozens of years and hundreds of billions of dollars will be needed for this. These can only be obtained by renouncing programs for restoration of the countryside, restructuring of industry, social programs, etc. This means that neither we nor our children, located in the geographic center of Europe, will be able to live in a European state. Is this what we need?

The third approach seems the most promising: Ukraine will not abandon the path that leads to nuclear-free status, but it will set conditions. We need financial assistance and compensation for nuclear components, guarantees of our national security on the part of the nuclear states, and, finally, sufficient time for the performance of this complex, dangerous, and expensive work.

Inasmuch as such a scale of elimination of nuclear arms is unprecedented, it is very difficult to calculate how much this operation will cost. However, one can be certain that the bill will run up into not millions but rather billions of dollars. This includes not only the purely military expenditures for destruction of delivery systems, neutralization of missile fuel, which the world does not have the technology to utilize, dismantling of underground equipment, disassembly and shipment of nuclear warheads, etc. Enormous sums must also be spent on social protection for the servicemen and members of their families. This includes tens of thousands of apartments, retraining, pensions, and resettlement of families. Therefore the \$175 million which the United States promised Ukraine for this operation is a miserly sum. It could only be accepted as an advance, as a first small contribution on the path to the establishment of long-term financing.

The documents must contain specific figures by way of compensation for the nuclear components that will be sent to Russia together with the warheads. And it must be a question not only of those components which will be in the strategic missiles but also of those which have already been shipped beyond the borders of Ukraine in tactical nuclear weapons.

It is not difficult to calculate the amount of compensation. There are five tonnes of plutonium and four tonnes of uranium in the tactical nuclear arms which Ukraine transferred to Russia. On the world market a tonne of uranium and a tonne of plutonium cost \$100 million and \$500 million respectively. If you include the nuclear materials located in the strategic weapons, the total comes to several billions. Thus only a fool would refrain from raising the issue of compensation in this situation.

On 4 February 1993 Belarus ratified the START-1 Treaty and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This fact may become another catalyst for anti-Ukrainian sentiment in the world. But it is dishonest to draw a simple analogy. Even though Ukraine and Belarus are two friendly neighboring states, similar in terms of both past and present, each has its own path toward nuclear disarmament. Especially when the structure of strategic nuclear forces differs fundamentally in terms of both quantity and quality. Belarus is armed with 75 mobile SS-25 missiles, which can be shipped to Russia over a period of several weeks without causing ecological damage or spending a single ruble on the movement of the missiles, with the exception of expenditures for fuel. This process is absolutely painless for Belarus.

It is entirely natural for Ukraine, like every other country in the world, to concern itself with the interests of its people. Nuclear arms, as the most important element of security and as a colossal military and material resource, are one of its foremost political problems. Everyone knows that such a position will not suit some political forces in near and distant foreign countries. It is advantageous for them to call the state-building processes in Ukraine nationalism. But we must look out for our own affairs firmly and with due consideration. It is important to understand the world, but we must also ensure that the world understands us.

Foreign Minister to U.S. for Talks

*LD2303155893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0926 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 23 Mar—Meeting and setting up contacts with the new administration is the prime objective of an official visit to the United States by Ukraine Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, which starts today. He has stated this in an interview with the POSTFACTUM agency.

The minister also intends to brief the U.S. secretary of state on the progress which has been made so far with the preparatory work on the ratification of the START I Treaty. Zlenko does not rule out that military-political issues will also be discussed, along with economic and political problems. He does not intend to conceal that the idea of ratifying the START I Treaty as a first step, while not rushing to sign the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Treaty until it has been fully studied, has recently become popular with Ukraine's people's deputies. The minister thinks that if this idea is realized, it will provoke negative reaction from the West.

During his visit, Zlenko also intends to meet the UN secretary general to discuss the problem of UN sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Further on Zlenko's U.S. Visit

*OW2303175193 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1714 GMT 23 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Tuesday [23 March] morning the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko went on a 3-day official visit to the United States.

He is scheduled to meet with the U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher, Defense Minister Les Aspin, senators, and congressmen.

Zlenko will conduct a press conference in Washington at the end of his visit.

The head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry also intends to meet with the U.N. General Secretary Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

The day before Zlenko reported to journalists in Kiev that he would inform Washington on preparation process to ratify the START-1 Treaty by the Ukrainian parliament.

According to Zlenko, Ukraine will present to the American party several issues which appeared during the discussion of the START-1 Treaty in the parliament's commissions.

The majority of deputies stand in favor of more reliable guarantees of Ukraine's nuclear security and increasing of compensations for Ukraine's expenditures caused by the liquidation of nuclear missiles; the deputies intend to put forward these demands to the U.N. Security Council member-countries. The minister noted that the American aid allocated for these purposes and totalling \$176 Mn is inadequate.

During his meeting with Butrus-Ghali, Zlenko also intends to ask the world community to allocate funds in order to compensate the damages inflicted to Ukraine as a result of fulfilling the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Kravchuk: Russian Crisis Will Not Effect Denuclearization

*OW2403211093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2020 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine will not change its stand on global problems such as nuclear disarmament, its territorial integrity, or human rights as soon as the situation in some region changes, President Kravchuk said at a meeting with representatives of the Ukrainian League of Independent Entrepreneurs in Kiev. He made it clear that "our attitude to a region may change but our approach to such problems cannot." The president denied reports on a possible change in Ukraine's nuclear status in response to a change in the Russian situation.

Kravchuk said that when he had a telephone talk with the Russian president he invited Boris Yeltsin to visit Ukraine

in order to discuss a number of outstanding issues. Yeltsin accepted the invitation but no date has been agreed upon.

Zlenko on Growing Opposition to Giving Up Nuclear Arms

*LD2503104393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
0900 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Text] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko stated at the talks on nuclear disarmament in Washington that the crisis in Russia had had a negative effect on political support for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Addressing THE WASHINGTON POST staff, he said that because of the unclear situation in Russia there was growing opposition in the Ukrainian parliament to the government decision to renounce nuclear weapons.

Dispute With Russia Over Heavy Bombers

*OW2403175693 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1710 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Ukraine does not intend to enter into a military alliance with Russia or to load its 'heavy bombers' with the tactical nuclear warheads that were handed over to Russia in May 1992. This is why there is no danger any more that these aircraft will be used as strategic bombers," Vadim Dolganov, Counsellor for Political Affairs of the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow told Interfax Wednesday [24 March].

He was surprised by the statement made by the Russian air force CINC [commander in chief] that "privatization" of some former USSR's Tu-95 and Tu-160 "heavy bombers" by Ukraine significantly undermines the defense capability of Russia and the CIS.

The counsellor thinks that there can be "no misunderstanding" over the aircraft which used to carry nuclear missiles in the USSR's air force and were strategic bombers. Some of them will be destroyed because their service life has ended and others, once nuclear weapons are dismantled from them, will be used for various purposes such as delivery of humanitarian aid.

On the other hand, Dolganov admitted that, with fuel in short supply, Ukraine air force planes do not do much flying and the crews lose their skills.

Ukraine Willing To Exchange Bombers

*OW2403210593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
2020 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine told Russia that it is prepared to exchange heavy strategic Tu-95 and Tu-106 bombers for Russian-made warplanes "of another kind." No response has been received to this proposal thus far, Interfax was told by Ukrainian Defense Ministry's press service officials. Earlier, the Russian Air Force commander Petr Deynekin had said that the strategic bombers based in Ukraine will cease to be operational unless Ukraine hands them over to Russia.

The press office officials said that the aircraft are operational and maintained properly.

The office intends to make a statement on this subject Thursday [25 March].

Foreign Minister Meets UN Secretary General

OW2403180093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1710 GMT 24 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko met with UN General Secretary Butrus Butrus-Ghali on Tuesday [23 March] in New York.

The press center of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry told Interfax that they discussed the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the problems Ukraine encountered due to the economic sanctions against Serbia.

Ukraine, the minister said, loses over \$1 Mn [million] a day from the interruption of cargo shipments along the Danube.

Informing Butrus-Ghali of the course of preparations in the Ukrainian parliament for the ratification of the START I Treaty, Zlenko advanced the idea of forming an international fund for nuclear disarmament, which could be used to compensate for expenses connected with the destruction of strategic nuclear missiles in former Soviet republics.

The United States is offering Ukraine \$175 Mn in aid to pay for the destruction of nuclear missiles. The Ukrainian parliament, however, feels this is not enough.

Butrus-Ghali was given a letter from the Ukrainian president regarding problems in collaboration between Ukraine and UN organs in resolving a wide range of political and economic problems.

Kravchuk 'Directive' on Nuclear Policy Commission

AU2503165893 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
24 Mar 93 p 2

["Ukrainian Presidential Directive on the Statute on the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy Subordinated to Ukraine's President" and text of the "Statute on the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy Subordinated to Ukraine's President;" issued in Kiev on 19 March]

[Text] 1. To approve the Statute on the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy Subordinated to Ukraine's President (in supplement).

2. Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers must make a provision in the state budget for 1993 for maintaining the personnel of the Secretariat of the Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy and specify conditions for the remuneration of its labor.

[Signed] L. Kravchuk, President of Ukraine
[Dated] 19 March 1993

1. The Commission for Questions of Nuclear Policy (henceforth "Commission") is a consultative and advisory body subordinated to Ukraine's president and has been created for elaborating scientifically substantiated proposals regarding the shaping of a nuclear policy.

The following are the main tasks of the Commission:

To prepare recommendations for Ukraine's president on what concerns the shaping of the state nuclear policy and mechanisms of its implementation, including in the military sphere;

—to analyze draft normative acts on questions of utilizing nuclear energy;

—to assess the conformity of concepts and programs for the development of the nuclear energy complex to international requirements and norms;

—to study new design and technological solutions in the sphere of nuclear energy utilization, including international projects that are important for Ukraine, and to elaborate, on that basis, corresponding proposals.

The Commission will function as a national expert for questions of atomic energy utilization and handling of radioactive waste.

2. In its activity, the Commission will be guided by Ukraine's Constitution and laws, Ukraine's Supreme Council decrees, edicts and directives issued by Ukraine's president, decisions adopted by the Ukrainian Government, and international agreements and accords.

3. The Commission will be headed by a chairman who will be appointed by and subordinated to Ukraine's president. The composition of the Commission must be approved by Ukraine's president on the recommendation by the Commission's chairman.

The Commission's chairman will have two deputies who will be elected by the Commission.

4. The main form of the Commission's work will involve meetings that will be held whenever necessary.

5. The organizational provision of the Commission's activity is the responsibility of its Secretariat.

6. Whenever necessary, the Commission may enlist, on a contractual basis, the services of individual scientists and specialists, including those from foreign states, and create groups of experts and consultants for fulfilling tasks entrusted to the Commission.

7. The financial and material and technical provision of the Commission's activity will be provided from the state budget.

Nationalist Assembly Demands Nuclear Status

AU2603075393 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
23 Mar 93 p 1

[Unattributed report published under the rubric "Fact"]

[Text] A conference under the motto "Ukraine's Nuclear Status is the Best Guarantee for Peace and Security in Europe" was held in Kiev. It was organized and held by the Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly. The nationalists called upon the Ukrainian president to create "Ukraine's Nuclear Committee" and to not join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Defense Minister: Supreme Council To Decide Nuclear Status

AU3003105693 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
26 Mar 93 p 3

["Excerpts" of news conference by Defense Minister Konstantyn Morozov with unidentified reporters at the National Press Club in Kiev; date not given: "Our Armed Forces Are Able To Defend Ukraine"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Question] Is there a variant of Ukraine's military doctrine as a nuclear state?

[Morozov] It is not such a difficult task to specify the content of a military doctrine. The main thing is to determine our political position in this question. It is a prerogative of the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council has already discussed a draft military doctrine once. As all of us understood, the main question has been and still is Ukraine's attitude toward nuclear weapons. The documents on the ratification of START I and of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty have already been submitted to the Supreme Council and, I think, they may be ready in the very near future. It will be a definitive stage: The Supreme Council will determine the content of the main—political—part of the military doctrine. The military-technical part is subordinated to it, and its content specifies how main military-political principles will be technically implemented. The Ministry of Defense is an executive structure that will be ready to adjust the military-technical part to the political principles. [passage omitted]

Air Force Chief Refutes Russian Assertions on Bombers

LD2703201593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 27 Mar 93

[Text] Having familiarized themselves with the statements made by Colonel General of Aviation Petr Deynekin, commander in chief of Russia's Air Force, in an interview with the IZVESTIYA newspaper, staff of the press service of Ukraine's Defense Ministry have come to the conclusion that they did not correspond to reality. If Ukraine does not hand over heavy bombers to the Russian Air Force in the next few months, these super-airplanes will fall into disrepair and will perhaps be useful only as scrap metal, General Deynekin argues.

Ukraine's right to heavy bombers and to any other military equipment which is deployed on its territory is confirmed by the Minsk agreements among the heads of the CIS states. Assertions that Ukraine privatized them are absolutely groundless. This is how Major General Borys Tymoshenko, chief of the Air Force and Air Defence Department of the Main Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, commented on Petr Deynekin's statements. He told the press service of the Ukrainian Military Department that Ukraine repeatedly offered the Russian Ministry of Defense an exchange of heavy bombers for other type of airplanes and spare parts and units for them. This was also discussed during the negotiations in Moscow which were held at the beginning of March between the Ukrainian military and representatives of the Russian Federation. However, the

Russians ignored these proposals. Borys Tymoshenko said that the strategic missile carriers which are deployed in Ukraine are in working condition and in full combat readiness, contrary to the assertions by General Deynekin.

Defense Minister Demands Assurances

LD3003130793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 30 Mar 93

[Text] Ukraine's Defense Minister Colonel-General Konstantyn Morozov has returned from Brussels to Kiev. He was taking part in a meeting of defense ministers of the NATO countries and of this organization's partner countries. Reporting this today, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry's press service said that in Brussels the leaders of military departments examined issues of cooperation in the maintenance of peace in the world and examined past and future cooperation on issues of defense.

We remind you that yesterday Konstantyn Morozov delivered a speech at the meeting of defense ministers of NATO countries and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. He noted, in particular, that one of the main goals of Ukraine is its nonnuclear status. Touching on guarantees of Ukraine's security the minister stressed that a U.S.-Russian treaty, which is agreed with Ukraine, and a subsequent statement by the UN Security Council with assurances of respect by the United States and Russia for Ukraine's independence and its territorial integrity, the inviolability of its borders, the nonuse of force or threat of using force, and the inadmissibility of economic pressure as a means of achieving political aims, is necessary.

Morozov Disagrees With U.S. Disarmament Plan

OW3003111193 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1040 GMT 30 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The West takes heed of what Ukraine has to say only as long as there are nuclear weapons on its soil, Konstantyn Morozov, Ukraine's Defense Minister told a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels where their East European counterparts were invited.

In explaining Kiev's views on essential issues in dealing with nuclear weapons Morozov emphasized that his country has been relentlessly working for the status of a nonnuclear state but he made it clear that those who feel that only nuclear states are taken seriously have good reasons to think so.

In the minister's opinion, the U.S., Russia, and the UN Security Council must make unambiguous statements declaring their respect for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity.

He expressed his concern that the non-interference policy of NATO member states vis-a-vis Ukraine has been pursued for too long. He also reproached NATO for keeping his country in the dark on the expenses of eliminating the missiles by the deadline which the U.S. offers so as to secure ratification of START-1 and START-2 by Kiev.

The minister disagreed with the U.S. aid to Ukraine for elimination of nuclear weapons being appropriated as part

of Washington's aid to Russia. This aid must be clearly earmarked and cover all the expenses, Morozov emphasized.

Ambassador to U.S. on Delay in Ratification

*OW0104172893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1638 GMT 1 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainians are optimistic about the future of Ukrainian-American relations even though the Ukrainian parliament wants to take its time as far as ratification of START-I is concerned, Oleg Belorus, Ukrainian ambassador in Washington, told journalists Thursday [1 April].

He insisted that the Ukrainian parliament had the perfect right to debate thoroughly all aspects of the treaty and the financing of dismantling the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian soil.

On the other hand, the ambassador said that Ukraine is guided by "the economic imperative" in its relations with the U.S.A. The most favorable treatment status accorded to Ukraine in May 1992 during President Kravchuk's visit has to be backed by concrete steps, the ambassador thinks.

Kravchuk Interviewed

*LD0304181593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 3 Apr 93*

[Report by station observer Valentyn Vasylo on "main points" of live interview with Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk on 2 April, answering questions posed by readership of MOLOD UKRAYINY newspaper; portions within quotation marks recorded]

[Excerpt] Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk, in a live Ukrainian television and radio broadcast on 2 April, answered a variety of questions posed by the readership of the newspaper MOLOD UKRAYINY. Radio Ukraine observer Valentyn Vasylo introduces the audience of Radio's Ukraine External Service to the main points of Leonid Kravchuk's answers.

[Vasylo] Here is what Leonid Kravchuk said answering the question on nuclear weapons in Ukraine, the first in a number of topics raised:

[Kravchuk] "It is not for the first time that this question is being asked. It is even being posed by deputies. Today I received a statement by Viche [People's Assembly] in Lvov. The statement openly demands that the president declare Ukraine a nuclear state.

"Well, to begin with, these issues today are no longer settled by the president, because there is a declaration by the Supreme Council, or rather a resolution by the Supreme Council, to the effect that Ukrainian policy in this sphere is gradually—I would like to stress this—gradually to attain a nuclear-free status and be a state which will accede to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. All of this is our policy.

"However, policy is one thing. We also must take exactly the road that we have determined and not be a state whose policy changes, because in that case we would not be

respected. I have already said this on several occasions and want to stress this once again for you.

"But there also are military, technological, economic, and other aspects of this matter. After all, a nuclear state can only be nuclear by having a nuclear industry. That is to say, the warheads that are today on the nuclear missiles cannot be used by Ukraine as weapons because they were not manufactured by us. This is the main point. We never want to use the warheads as weapons. We stand for the elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Thus Ukraine wants to (?set an example), but to do so prudently.

"We have certain issues that must be settled, those in respect of Ukraine's security, compensation, aid, finance, organization, and others. These issues must be settled and we will settle them in accordance with our state policy." [passage omitted]

Prime Minister: No Nuclear Problem

*OW0604105293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1028 GMT 6 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine's Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma has urged the U.S. "to remember that Ukraine with a population of 52 Mn [million] is on the map of the former USSR". Talking to newsmen after Monday's [5 April] meeting with U.S. congressmen, led by the House's Democratic majority leader Richard Gephardt, he suggested that "Ukraine and other republics might have been forgotten at the Russo-American summit in Vancouver".

In Mr. Kuchma's words, he assured the congressmen that the problem of nuclear arms on the territory of Ukraine was non-existent. However, he declined comment on a statement by the Russian Government, deploring Ukraine's position toward the nuclear weapons on its soil. He said he was expecting the full text of the statement through official channels.

Parliament Chairman Links START I, Security Guarantees

*LD0604084293 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0500 GMT 6 Apr 93*

[Text] The parliament will ratify START I and the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty on the condition that Ukraine will be given guarantees of its security. This was stated by Ivan Plyushch at a meeting with the delegation of U.S. Congress representatives which took place on 5 April in Kiev.

Sale of Weapons-Grade Uranium to U.S. Questioned

*PM2503142593 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 0850 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[From the "Press Express" program by unidentified reporter]

[Text] A number of questions have been generated by an IZVESTIYA report regarding the sale of 500 tonnes of weapons-grade uranium from the Russian nuclear charges

being dismantled for use in U.S. nuclear power stations. These questions have been asked in the latest issue of the weekly VEK by Gennadiy Ivanov, a nuclear scientist from Arzamas-16. By mutual agreement we, along with the Americans, will indeed remove warheads from missiles and dismantle the charges. But it is not the same thing if the Americans stockpile and store their uranium assemblies, while we remove their basic weapons-grade qualities and then sell them to the Americans. Although our nuclear power industry has appreciably lagged behind the Americans since Chernobyl, it will develop. That is why, the scientist stresses, we will need the uranium that we are in such a hurry to sell. Ivanov wonders whether we should begrudge these 500 tonnes. Of course we should; this represents an entire 4 percent of the explored world uranium stock. Now another question. Perhaps there is a great deal of benefit to be derived from the transaction? Yes, there is. For the Americans. Once they have used the uranium they will obtain electricity worth \$4-5 billion. We will get just \$200 million for the first consignment. Lastly, VEK raises a reasonable question: Perhaps we should not be in such a hurry; the cost of energy sources will after all rise and Russia's vast expanses can harbor several secure store-houses. Then we will have a supply of nuclear fuel for a long time—provided of course that we overcome the Chernobyl syndrome.

Reports on Conversion of SS-25 ICBM to Civilian Use

Experimental 'Start' Rocket Launched

LD2503172793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1537 GMT 25 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Text] Moscow, 25 March—Today, at 1615 hours, the launch of the "Start" experimental rocket carrying a space apparatus was carried out. The ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this at the press center of the Military-Space Forces.

The mass of the space apparatus is 260 kg. The operating height of the orbit is 700 km.

The "Start" rocket is a converted rocket. It has been created on the basis of the "RS-12M" ballistic missile that is in service (known in the West as SS-25). The new space complex has been created from extra-budget funds (taking part in financing the complex were the "IVK" joint-stock company, the "Kompleks" Scientific and Technical Center [NTTs], and the "Bauman" State Technical College in Moscow). Thanks to this, the producer of rockets of this class—the Votkinsk machinebuilding works in Udmurtia—was given the opportunity to apply its state-of-the-art output for peaceful purposes, too. Wide opportunities are opening up here inasmuch as the "Start" can put into orbit space apparatuses with a mass of up to one tonne, which it is inexpedient to do by means of other carrier-rockets being operated today.

The space apparatus will be controlled by the Flight Control Center of apparatuses for scientific and national economy purposes, which is part of the Military-Space Forces.

Orbit Parameters Given

LD2603115793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0925 GMT 26 Mar 93

[Text] Moscow, 26 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—Today the Flight Control Center reported that on 25 March 1993 the first ever launch of a "Start-1" experimental satellite was carried out with the help of a "Start-1" rocket carrier from Plesetsk cosmodrome.

The "Start-1" rocket carrier was designed within the conversion framework on the basis of the RS-12M intercontinental ballistic missile, which is known abroad as the SS-25 missile. The modernization of this missile fully meets the conditions of the START II Russian-U.S. Treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

The "Start-1" satellite, which is a dummy of correct size and weight for flying-design trials of the carrier rocket, has been placed in orbit with the following parameters:

initial period of revolution	101 minutes;
apogee	966 km;
perigee	695 km;
orbital inclination	75.8 degrees

Report on Research Center

PM2903133593 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 26 Mar 93

[By Sergey Slipchenko from Plesetsk; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Slipchenko] This rocket has already been adapted to civilian purposes. No treaties have been signed yet, but a scientific research center in Moscow is already working on converting missiles into civilian rockets. Look: it has no wheels, no cabin, and no engine—in fact there is nothing to make this missile mobile and thus capable of being fired from any point at other countries. The launch of a communications satellite is being rehearsed here—it is being put into orbit at an altitude of approximately 200 km. In the future, this rocket, which will theoretically be a five-stage one, will put payloads of 550 kg into orbits at 700 km.

It was interesting to watch the foreign guests taking photographs of all these stilts. This is one of the conditions of the START II treaty. All conversions carried out by the KOMPLEKS scientific and technological center are connected with this treaty. This rocket went into production nine years ago. Just imagine how many of these we now have in our country.

Have we opened up a world market with this launch, or not? Am I right in thinking that there are practically no systems like these in the world?

[V.I. Bolysov of the Strategic Rocket forces] I am deeply convinced that this is so. Eliminating missiles by launching satellites is no doubt the most rational, logical, and correct way.

Further on Plans for Start-1

93WC0044A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian
26 Mar 93 p 1

[Article by Boris Panasyan: "The Rocket Has Been Launched but as Yet There Is No Payload: Commercial Launch of a Ballistic Missile"]

[Text] The Russian commercial firm "I.V.K.-Group" and the Moscow Thermotechnics Institute intend to take their place in the world market for the commercial launch of payloads into near-earth orbit. Their pretensions are fully justified: yesterday at the Plesetsk space-launch facility, there was a successful demonstration launch of a vehicle that represents a commercial version of the intercontinental ballistic missile RS-12M. This type of launch vehicle permits launches significantly more often and at less expense than with analogous foreign developments. But this does not rule out a keen fight between "I.V.K.-Group" and competing American firms.

The "Start-1" system is a commercial version of the RS-12M missile (SS-25 under the NATO classification) that is comprised of a four-stage solid-fuel rocket with a mobile launch complex on a flatbed truck. The missile is capable of putting a light satellite (or other payload) weighing about 550 kg into circular orbit at a height of up to 700 km. The rights of ownership of the technology of the conversion of the SS-25 and of the system itself belong to the concern "I.V.K.-Group" (project sponsor), the Moscow Thermotechnics Institute (developer of the military prototype of the system), and the Scientific-Technical Center "Kompleks" (a commercial organization under the Thermotechnics Institute).

The "I.V.K.-Group" is a holding company with annual sales of 9 billion rubles in 1992. It includes a number of Russian and joint firms in the areas of import-export operations, production of computer equipment, and publishing work.

In the opinion of the organizers of the project, the demand for launches of light satellites now exceeds the supply in the world market and they intend to take advantage of this fact. The American aerospace firms and the European consortium Arianspace, which share about equally in this market, are not keeping up with orders. This has to do with the fact that light satellites are launched on heavy rockets. Their launch requires a lengthy preparatory cycle, which is responsible for the high cost of each launch. Clients are basically American and European firms and laboratories, who account for about 80 percent of the launches of the low-orbit satellites used in communication networks and for scientific purposes.

The "I.V.K.-Group" and the Thermotechnics Institute have entered the market with the first light launch vehicle, which immediately demonstrated a high level of competitiveness. The price per kilogram of launched payload will presumably be \$10,000-15,000 compared with the current \$20,000-30,000. At the same time, it will be possible to accomplish launches even every week, whereas now the preparations require about a month. The main competitor of "I.V.K.-Group" is the American firm Orbital Sciences, which also

intends to enter the market by the end of the year with the light launch vehicle Taurus, a modernization of the military missile MX.

The profit from future contracts will go to all participants in the project but for the time being each of them is looking for future clients. The Thermotechnics Institute has already sent to Pretoria a proposal on the use of the "Start-1" complex to launch the satellites of the Republic of South Africa from the territory of the republic but it has not yet received an answer.

Missile Tested for Possible Space Launch

PM3003105193 Moscow Ostankino Television First
Channel Network in Russian 2100 GMT 26 Mar 93

[Report by Aleksey Shiryayev; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Shiryayev] In the 35-year history of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, various types of launch vehicles have taken off from its launch sites. In all, over 1,500 launches have been carried out in this time. However, in the cosmodrome's history so far there has been no launch such as this one.

[A. V. Bal, deputy chief of the Plesetsk Cosmodrome] We are solving one of the scientific-technical problems connected with using missiles to launch space equipment. It is expedient not to just blow up missiles which are being withdrawn from operational readiness but to adapt them for economic purposes. A space rocket complex could be designed on basis of the RS-12-M strategic missile, which today is still in operational readiness but which could be used in the future to launch artificial Earth satellites.

Russian Crisis 'Pretext' for Remaining Nuclear Power

MK2703133293 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 27 Mar 93
p 3

[Mikhail Shchipanov commentary: "We Get the Crisis, Ukraine Gets the Missiles?"]

[Text] The constitutional crisis gripping Russia has spurred on those who advocate the turning of Ukraine into a nuclear power, de jure this time. Naturally, political instability in Moscow has come as a balm for the souls of Ukrainian radical nationalists who never tire of arguing, as they do, that a "handful" of nuclear missiles cannot do any harm to their country if it comes to blows with Moscow. Nowadays people are talking quite openly about the retention of some nuclear facilities by Ukraine, a country that promised, under the Lisbon protocol, to move over into the category of nonnuclear powers. And not just any people, but one of the foremost political personages—Pavlychko, chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Commission.

The new scenario for Ukraine's joining the nuclear club is plain: Kiev ratifies the SALT I [as published] treaty that provides for scrapping only part of the strategic carriers deployed on Ukrainian territory, while everything not covered by the treaty remains in the country as a keepsake, so to

speak. This souvenir, in fact, promises to be quite valuable—some 40 modern mobile SS-24 missiles. The only trouble is that a legal pretext is important for advocates of Ukraine's "nuclearization." Had there been no crisis in Moscow, it would have to have been invented.

Further Reports on Belarusian Denuclearization

Chairman Confirms Nuclear-Free Status

LD2903193793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian
1700 GMT 29 Mar 93

[Text] The Belarusian national center for strategic initiatives East-West has circulated a report stating that the concept of neutrality conflicts with the basic interests of the sovereign Republic of Belarus.

Stanislav Shushkevich, head of the Belarusian parliament, has rejected this opinion. Speaking at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet, he confirmed his adherence to a neutral, nuclear-free status for Belarus.

Arms May Be Removed Ahead of Schedule

LD0204143893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1412 GMT
2 Apr 93

[By BELINFORM correspondent Leonid Tratshevskiy for TASS]

[Text] Minsk April 2 TASS—Former Soviet nuclear strategic weapons deployed in Belarus can be transferred to Russia earlier than in the envisaged 7-year period, according to Gennadiy Gichkin, head of the Russian delegation at talks with Belarusian military on the problem.

The fourth meeting of Russian and Belarusian experts which ended on Friday succeeded to practically complete the two major agreements—on the pull out of strategic forces to Russia and on the status of strategic units in Belarus, Gichkin told BELINFORM.

Mutually acceptable solutions to the problems were found, he said, adding that the agreements may be ready in the first half of April and will be submitted to prime ministers of both countries.

One problem which is yet to be settled concerns the sharing of property and construction of housing for servicemen of Russian strategic forces in Belarus. But the solution of the problem does not depend on the military, according to Gichkin.

Russia 'Gratified' by Outcome of Talks

PM0604111393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Apr 93 p 3

[Report by Valeriy Kovalev: "Treaty Almost Ready"]

[Text] Minsk—The latest, the fourth, meeting of Russian and Belarusian expert commissions on strategic forces ended in Minsk on 2 April.

Military experts, diplomats, and lawyers from the two countries put 2 days of intensive effort into the preparation of a draft agreement on the withdrawal of strategic forces

temporarily stationed on the territory of Belarus and a draft treaty on the status of strategic forces' military formations in the Republic of Belarus.

As Colonel General Gennadiy Gichkin, head of the Russian military delegation, told your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, the sides have all but completed the work on both documents, and the draft treaty and draft agreement will be able to be initialed and presented to the Russian and Belarusian government heads by the end of April. This view was shared by Major General Nikolay Churkin, who headed the Belarusian military delegation.

The outcome is all the more gratifying in view of the fact that the issues that were being examined at the talks were by no means simple. During the talks the experts agreed on the procedure for the withdrawal of strategic forces and hand-over and receipt of the military camps that are being vacated, the principles of the division of military property and material and technical facilities, and security measures for the transportation of nuclear weapons. All these matters were reflected in the draft agreement. The withdrawal schedule was discussed in outline, but the sides decided that the 7-year period allocated for it in accordance with the international accords can be somewhat reduced.

Work on the draft treaty on the status of strategic forces' military formations temporarily stationed in Belarus took place in a spirit of mutual understanding. Only one problem was not finally resolved: A large number of Belarus-born commissioned and warrant officers is serving in the Russian strategic forces and many of them have expressed a desire to stay in their homeland after their units have been withdrawn to the Russian Federation, but by no means all of them have housing. The question of financing the construction of housing for them arose in this connection. The Belarusian side declared its readiness to take responsibility for the housing construction and build it not only for its own boys, but also for Russian servicemen who have no accommodations, but on condition that Russia agrees to finance the construction.

Ukrainian Defense, Foreign Ministry Statement on Nuclear Arms Safety

TASS Report

LD3103211193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2043 GMT
31 Mar 93

[By UKRINFORM for TASS]

[Text] Kiev April 1 TASS—"The issues of nuclear weapons in Ukraine are currently being considered by the Ukrainian Parliament which will adopt a resolution meeting the interests of the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian state," says a statement by the Ukrainian Defence and Foreign Ministries issued in connection with the concern about the safety of nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine, which was expressed by Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev at a meeting with his colleagues from the North Atlantic Council for Cooperation, in St. Petersburg on Wednesday.

The statement said that artificial agitation [word as received] around Ukrainian nuclear weapons is aimed at achieving

the extension of Russian jurisdiction of these weapons and depriving Ukraine of its right to compensation for components of these weapons.

Ukraine has repeatedly declared and declares again that it is prepared to discuss and resolve problems of nuclear and ecological safety of strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine at any level and is prepared to consider a possibility of inviting an authoritative international commission of experts, the statement said.

Further Report

OW0104203893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1405 GMT 1 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense and Foreign Ministries have published a statement saying all matters concerning nuclear weapons stationed on the republic's territory are currently being considered by the Ukrainian parliament, which will take a decision meeting the interests of the Ukrainian people.

The aim of the present-day stir around the nuclear weapons stationed in Ukraine is to have Russia extend its jurisdiction to them, depriving Ukraine of the right to receive compensation for their components, the statement says.

Ukraine has repeatedly stated, the document says, and states now that it is prepared to consider and solve at any level problems concerning the safety of strategic nuclear forces stationed on its territory, and can contemplate inviting an authoritative international expert commission.

Russian Government Statement on Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons

Text of Russian Statement

LD0504164093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1030 GMT 5 Apr 93

["The Government of the Russian Federation Has Issued a Statement With Regard to Nuclear Weapons Stationed on the Territory of Ukraine"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—The government of the Russian Federation has issued a statement here. It says:

Recently the situation around nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine has sharply deteriorated. Ukrainian representatives plainly declare that these nuclear weapons belong to Ukraine. Such statements can only be interpreted as a claim by Ukraine to the possession of nuclear weapons.

This stance adopted by the Ukrainian leadership indicates direct violation of the decision adopted by the CIS heads of state on 6 July 1992 about the participation of CIS member states in the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. According to this decision, which had also been signed by Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk, the Russian Federation is the only state out of all the legal successors of the USSR to possess nuclear weapons. Other CIS member states have decided to join the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the capacity of states not possessing nuclear weapons.

Kiev's claims to the possession of nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine also violate the Lisbon protocol to the START I treaty according to which Ukraine undertook an obligation to join in the very near future the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the capacity of a nuclear-free state. The written statement of the Ukrainian side with regard to the signing of that protocol clearly indicates that "the right and responsibility of possessing nuclear weapons of the former USSR has been given solely to the Russian Federation with the express agreement of Ukraine and all the other legal successors of the former USSR."

Kiev's policy is also at variance with Ukraine's commitments with regard to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory with the aim of dismantling and destroying them by the end of 1994. On the contrary, Ukraine is taking practical steps aimed at taking nuclear weapons on the territory of this country into its own hands. Thus, already in April 1992, the rocket and air army, together with combat units and subunits stationed in Ukraine, were included in the composition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Later, a new staff structure was formed in its armed forces—the center for the administrative control of troops of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's strategic nuclear forces. By a decision of the ministry's main headquarters, all nuclear equipment units stationed in Ukraine were placed under the center's command. The personnel of two such units in charge of over 600 nuclear munitions swore allegiance to Ukraine. The list of actions of this kind grows longer by the day. In connection with the abovementioned, the government of the Russian Federation considers it necessary to state the following:

Russia, understanding its great responsibility to the world community, is firmly advocating that the nuclear weapons that are temporarily sited on Ukraine territory should be under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The position of Ukraine, which opposes this in violation of commitments taken upon itself, is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences. The effectiveness of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons regime is under threat.

A question mark is put over whether the START I and START II treaties will come into effect; i.e., over the process of real nuclear disarmament.

The government of the Russian Federation would like to draw attention to the undisputed fact that nuclear weapons cannot belong to a nuclear-free state. Only a nuclear state can possess such weapons. It has to be emphasized that the safety of nuclear weapons is indivisible. It can only be ensured through a system of links connected in series under a single command and control. This matter is too serious and it calls for a responsible attitude. All legal and political prerequisites are already in place. It is now just a question of implementing them. Nuclear weapons cannot and must not be an object of political games.

Russia, as a nuclear state, is prepared to do its share in response to Ukraine's appeals in order to make it easier for Ukraine to meet its international commitments. As a depository of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,

Russia is prepared to provide, along with other depositories, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, guarantees of Ukraine's security, in accordance with the wishes of the Ukrainian side. These guarantees are to come into effect after Ukraine joins the treaty as a nonnuclear state.

In addition to solving the issue of ensuring the safety of nuclear arms in Ukraine and striving to fully remove all anxiety regarding these arms, the Russian side proposes to detach as quickly as possible the front sections from the missiles stationed in Ukrainian territory and to take all nuclear armaments to Russia where they will be subsequently destroyed under Ukraine's control as stipulated by the Russian-Ukrainian agreement signed in April 1992. In order to completely exclude the possible use of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory, in addition to political guarantees (which are quite sufficient as they are) all the weapon-delivery vehicles could be relieved of flight assignments within the next few months.

Russia is also ready to solve constructively the issue of the utilization of nuclear weapons, which is of interest to the Ukrainian side, in such a way that the nuclear substances that are retrieved could be used as fuel for Ukrainian atomic power stations. The Russian side has already put forward its proposals on this account. Now it is Kiev's turn.

Taking into account the special importance of ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation is ready to fulfill all the tasks aimed at maintaining these weapons in Ukrainian territory in a safe state given the understanding that the Ukrainian side will provide all the necessary conditions.

A responsible moment has arrived when a balanced decision should be taken immediately, a decision that is not aimed at obtaining political or other dividends. The peoples of both Ukraine and Russia and the whole international community will gain from it.

Russia is ready to solve immediately all the abovementioned problems within the framework of the Russian-Ukrainian talks currently under way.

Ukraine Diplomat on Russian Statement

*OW0504125493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1225 GMT 5 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "Everything is topsy-turvy" in the statement of the Russian Government on the Ukrainian position concerning nuclear disarmament, Vadim Dolganov, counsellor of the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow, told INTERFAX Monday [5 April]. He made it clear that he was speaking in personal capacity because no official response has arrived from Kiev thus far.

In particular, the statement accuses Ukraine of an intention to get hold of the nuclear weapons stationed temporarily on the country's soil.

Moscow wants these weapons to remain under Russian jurisdiction and had said that as a depository of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty, the Russian Federation is prepared, together with the U.S. and Britain, other depositories, to provide Ukraine guarantees of security which would become valid as soon as it adheres to the Treaty as a nonnuclear state.

Russia also proposes dismantling the warheads from the missiles deployed in Ukraine and removing all nuclear warheads to Russia for subsequent destruction under Ukrainian supervision and declares its willingness to resolve in a constructive spirit the issue of utilizing the warheads.

This statement, the Ukrainian diplomat said, will not be overlooked by the Ukrainian Foreign Minister or top officials. He emphasized that Ukraine never intended to become a nuclear state and said so as far back as in 1990 when the Soviet Union was still in existence. Dolganov described all accusations leveled at Kiev as a political game.

Ukraine had for a long time been pressing for what is proposed in the Russian statement, Dolganov said. He expressed the hope that the Russian government will follow up on its the declared intentions.

Russian Officials Criticize Ukrainian Attitude

*OW0504165493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1618 GMT 5 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine has taken steps indicating that Kiev wants to have nuclear arms, Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Colonel-General Boris Gromov told a news conference in Moscow on Monday [5 April]. General Gromov said such actions jeopardized nuclear non-proliferation and could prove a risky temptation for those countries that were close to going nuclear.

Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Berdennikov said that Russia and the United States had presented to Kiev written security guarantees, including the non-use of force and the inviolability of borders, however, the Ukrainian authorities argued those were insufficient.

General Gromov told journalists that after the signing of the Lisbon protocols Kiev turned down Moscow's proposal for extending its jurisdiction over the nuclear arms left by the former USSR on its territory. He said the Ukrainian authorities had refused to let nuclear warheads be removed from delivery vehicles and moved to Russia for elimination under bilateral control. Kiev also rejected the proposal for cancelling flight parameters for all delivery vehicles (currently there are 176 missile launchers and 43 strategic nuclear-capable bombers in Ukraine. - INTERFAX).

General Gromov said that "Russia is ready to continue supplying the replaceable components for nuclear warheads subordinate to Russia, for instance, those deployed in Belarus and Kazakhstan". He said that putting the question in any other way would be tantamount to a direct violation of the non-proliferation regime.

Russia's chief negotiator at the talks with Ukraine Yuriy Dubinin has said that Moscow is prepared to maintain the safety of nuclear arms and consider the question of utilizing

fissionable materials for nuclear power stations, as well as carry out the guarantee maintenance and manufacturer's supervision of the launchers. He said all those proposals had been submitted to Kiev, but there had been no reply yet.

General Gromov made it quite clear that for the time being Russia exercised full control over the nuclear arms in the territory of the former USSR and was capable of maintaining their safety. However, he cannot "rule out the possibility of the use of strategic nuclear arms aboard any of the 43 nuclear-capable bombers" (each carrying about 670 nuclear warheads), which are based on Ukrainian territory and whose crews have taken an oath of allegiance to Ukraine.

Further Report

LD0504164793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1550 GMT
5 Apr 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow April 5 TASS—The situation that has formed around nuclear weapons which are temporarily deployed on Ukraine's territory has generated increasing concern lately because Ukrainian leaders, contrary to their statement on Ukraine's nuclear-free status, are carrying out practical measures testifying to its desire to possess nuclear weapons, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Boris Gromov said.

He spoke at a press conference today which was held in connection with the Russian Government's statement concerning nuclear weapons deployed on Ukraine's territory.

Mindful of the fact that Ukraine officially stated that it will join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear-free state shortly, the Russian side came up with the proposal to take under its jurisdiction the nuclear weaponry temporarily deployed on Ukraine's territory. However, Ukraine did not accept this proposal.

"Being aware of the crisis situation regarding nuclear safety that has formed in Ukraine and the unpredictability of possible consequences in the event of accidents involving nuclear weapons, we believe it is necessary that the next round of talks with Ukraine shall return once again to solving this problem in the hope that the Ukrainian side will continue these talks in the more constructive vein," Gromov said.

Russia attaches immense importance to Ukraine's move to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear-free state, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov said. This is very important as a conference to review the nuclear non-proliferation treaty should take place in 1995. It will decide the issue of extending this treaty and Russia advocates that it be extended for unlimited duration.

In case a new nuclear state emerges, this may put in peril the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime and serve as a very dangerous precedent for other countries that are on the verge of acquiring the nuclear capability. "In this regard, we

are interested in the commitments voluntarily assumed by Ukraine to be fulfilled as soon as possible," Berdennikov emphasised.

Differences With Ukraine Over START Explained

MK0604111493 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 6 Apr 93 p 6

[Viktor Zamyatin report: "Russian-Ukrainian Differences Over START. Moscow Does Not Agree With Kiev's Arguments"]

[Text] In its statement yesterday the Russian Government expressed concern over Ukraine's actions testifying to its desire to acquire the status of a nuclear power. The statement was delivered after the Russian and U.S. presidents had expressed the hope in Vancouver that all the former USSR's countries would join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Yuriy Dubinin, head of the Russian delegation to the talks with Ukraine, set out the essence of the statement at a briefing yesterday. He noted that Kiev, despite its statements about wanting nonnuclear status, is carrying out measures testifying to the reverse. In particular, in 1992 Ukraine included the 43d Missile Army and the 46th Air Army in the composition of its armed forces, and the Center for Administrative Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces Troops was recently created within the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. Russia, which the U.S. President supported in Vancouver, believes that nuclear weapons cannot have "two masters." According to Dubinin, Moscow intends to return to the discussion of this question in the near future. He also said that Russia's proposals had already been conveyed to Ukraine, and now it remains to wait for its reaction. In justifying the dragging out of nuclear disarmament, Kiev is advancing both political reasons (nuclear weapons are a factor deterring "Moscow's imperial ambitions") and financial reasons (Ukraine's experts believe that implementing the START I Treaty will cost the republic \$2.8 billion, while the United States is promising it only \$175 million of aid). Moscow rejects these arguments and considers the guarantee of Ukraine's security on the part of Russia and the United States to be entirely adequate. Yevgeniy Ambartsimov, head of the Russian parliamentary committee for international affairs, noted that Ukraine is obviously "testing the water as to retaining its nuclear status," which will make Russia's ratification of the START II Treaty much harder. Tomorrow KOMMERSANT-DAILY will acquaint readers with Ukraine's reaction to the Russian Government's statement.

[Boxed material] Currently there are 1,600 nuclear warheads in Ukraine on:

- 130 SS-19 (15A25) intercontinental missiles;
- 46 SS-24 (RS-22) intercontinental missiles;
- 24 Tu-95MS heavy bombers;
- 19 Tu-160 heavy bombers.

Russia's proposals conveyed to Ukraine:
to transfer all nuclear weapons located in Ukraine exclusively to Russian jurisdiction

to remove warheads and to transport to Russia and destroy under Ukrainian control all nuclear ammunition to discontinue training sorties by delivery vehicles in Ukraine

to use salvageable nuclear ammunition for fuel for Ukrainian nuclear electric power stations
to create a system to supervise nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory.

U.S.-Russian Vancouver Summit Declaration

LD0504041093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0259 GMT 5 Apr 93

[Excerpts] Moscow April 5 ITAR-TASS—Follows the full text of the document the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States issued at the end of their two-day summit in Vancouver.

Having met in Vancouver, Canada on April 3-4, President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Bill Clinton of the United States of America declared their firm commitment to the two countries' dynamic and effective U.S.-Russian partnership that strengthens international stability. The two presidents approved a comprehensive strategy of cooperation to promote democracy, security and peace. [passage omitted]

The leaders of the United States and Russia attached great importance to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. They reaffirmed their determination to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), make it universal and give it an unlimited duration. The presidents stressed their expectation that all countries of the former USSR which are not already NPT members will promptly confirm their adherence to the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. They urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its IAEA safeguards obligations, which remain in force, and to retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT.

The presidents agreed that efforts of Russia and the United States will be directed toward the entry into force of the Start I Treaty and the ratification of the Start II Treaty as soon as possible. They affirmed that Russia and the United States intend to cooperate, on the basis of their mutual interest, in environmentally safe elimination of nuclear forces pursuant to relevant arms control agreements, in construction of a storage facility for nuclear materials and in the controlling, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials. The United States reiterated its readiness to provide assistance to Russia for these purposes. The presidents called for prompt conclusion, on mutually acceptable terms, of the negotiations on an agreement on the conversion and sale for peaceful purposes of nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons.

The presidents underscored their determination to broaden interaction and consultations between Russia and the United States in the areas of defence and security. They instructed their ministers of defence to explore further possibilities in that direction.

The presidents noted the progress achieved at the recent United States-Russian talks on chemical weapons in Geneva. They welcomed the progress made in preparing the protocols necessary to submit the "agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons" of June 1, 1990 for approval by the legislative bodies of the Russian Federation and the United States. They also welcomed progress achieved in developing agreement on the preparation and implementation of the second phase of the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding of September 23, 1989 regarding a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to prohibition of chemical weapons.

The presidents agreed that it is necessary to achieve the earliest possible resolution of questions about cooperation in non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology in all its aspects, in accordance with the principles of existing international agreements. They also decided to work together to remove obstacles impeding Russia's access to the global market in high technology and related services. The presidents agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date, and that their governments would consult with each other accordingly. [passage omitted]

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Disarmament Expert Favors Nonnuclear Defense Systems

OW2203144693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1423 GMT 22 Mar 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboynikov and Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The replacement of nuclear deterrent by non-nuclear defense systems opens much greater prospects than simple nuclear disarmament does, the vice president of the Russian Strategic Research Institute and a member of the London-based Institute for Strategic Research, Aleksandr Savelyev, told Interfax.

According to him, life has confirmed how right President Ronald Reagan was, when 10 years ago, on March 23, 1983, he proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The former USSR strongly opposed the idea. At the height of the "cold war" Moscow believed that the Americans sought to gain unilateral advantages and undermine strategic stability. According to the USSR, SDI could be transformed into what it called "strike space weapons."

In the meantime SDI was a defense system from the start, since it provided for replacing nuclear systems with non-nuclear ones, and, consequently, for lowering the level of nuclear confrontation, the expert noted.

According to Savelyev, the fact that Russia and the USA no longer view each other as potential adversaries has dispelled fears connected with the possible gaining of superiority by means of deploying defense systems by one of the two sides. "The new threats to peace raised once again the issue of the role played by defense systems. The proliferation of nuclear

missiles and the emergence of new nuclear powers, such as Ukraine, on the world map became the greatest threat," he said.

According to the expert, this paves the way for broad interaction between Russia and the USA. An agreement on this was reached in principle last year, when President Boris Yeltsin was visiting Washington. Groups have already been formed to work out the concept and technical details of a Russian-American program, which other countries can join.

Colonel Comments on U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

*LD2403140993 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian
0430 GMT 24 Mar 93*

[Interview with Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Radionov by correspondent Mikhail Arkhipov; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Ten years ago, on 23 March 1983, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] was announced. The world community viewed it as a practical implementation of the fictional Star Wars. For the former Soviet Union, the prospect of Star Wars was quite tangible, and it called for a counter-initiative. To tell us how things stand these days, here is Colonel Aleksandr Ivanovich Radionov, being interviewed by our correspondent Mikhail Arkhipov:

[Begin recording] **Radionov:** Much has changed in 10 years. The program's priorities, and also the volume of funding, have undergone changes. The main trend of the program, however, has remained unchanged throughout, as I see it. The primary aim of SDI was to obtain state-of-the-art technologies for the purpose of ensuring the security of the United States by using and developing new space weapons.

Despite the fact that the climate of relations between the United States and the Russian Federation has become significantly warmer of late, it is too early to speak of possible full-scale partnership in the area of strategic defense. This is why. A whole range of agreements signed in this area notwithstanding, Americans have long viewed us as possible partners [sentence as heard]. In the end, they have reached the conclusion that partnership can only take the shape of the purchase of state-of-the-art space technologies. This is, on the whole, what is happening now. Naturally enough, we are not getting anything in return in terms of technological innovations.

The Americans are building the SDI system. Whatever shape it has taken by now—be it along the lines envisaged by President Reagan or as envisaged by the current President Clinton—they are building it for themselves. They do not intend to share all those strategic innovations with anyone. They are solving the problems of their own national security, and by no means solving Russia's problems or those with whom they cooperate in their work on SDI.

A whole range of successful, or even brilliant, experiments have been carried out within the framework of SDI. In the course of these experiments, they intercepted in space either

dummy warheads, mock warheads, or even real warheads. All this was done for experimental purposes, however, in order to test the concept.

As to whether we need such a system, all I can say is that we have probably not paid serious attention to these things. After all, while building their SDI, the Americans put their stakes on space. They proceeded from the assumption that many problems can be solved from space. If we turn to reconnaissance, objects of the size of a large orange can be discerned from space. It is also possible to read license plates on vehicles and to determine the nature of an enterprise from the smoke discharged from its funnels. All these things contribute to assessing the level of economic development of a state. In military terms, they can give advance warning to the country's leadership about any mobilization of forces.

Arkhipov: Aleksandr Ivanovich, what about the Military-Space Forces? Do they have anything to do with the Russian SDI, and do their plans include the construction of such an SDI?

Radionov: I think it would be incorrect to say that the military-space forces of the Russian Federation can, in some manner, be in opposition to SDI, or that they can somehow join in the creation of the Russian SDI. The simple reason is that, in essence, no such work is conducted in Russia.

Arkhipov: But wasn't there an asymmetrical option, proclaimed by the last president of the USSR?

Radionov: A long time has passed since the asymmetrical option, which had little to do with the development of state-of-the-art technologies, particularly space technologies. In principle, all the work has been suspended. In my view, the attitude we took toward these things was singularly unstatesman-like. It was extremely slighting. One obvious example is that we did not pay serious attention to the development of new technologies, including space technologies. We did not even pay attention to the fact that the Americans obtained new composite materials, which they went on to use on a national scale. Whereas with us, when we proclaimed our anti-SDI, it was on the one hand a mere political gesture, and on the other, it was a response from certain individuals in the then military leadership. [end recording]

Pentagon's Request for Funding SDI Program Viewed

*LD2603104393 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2110 GMT 25 Mar 93*

[Commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] The Pentagon has requested from Congress \$3,800 million next fiscal year for the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative], also known as the Star Wars program. Vladislav Kozyakov comments:

It is quite significant that during their election campaign last year the Democrat leaders called for cutting spending on military programs in space. Now, when it has come to business, they have for some reason neglected their election pledges. There have been proposals for cuts in any articles of

the Pentagon budget but one: The Star Wars plan. The new administration is planning to spend on such research no less than the previous one. What is the reason? Why is the American taxpayer suggested to spend at the next fiscal year starting on 1 October billions of dollars on the development of space weapons conceived back in the Cold War years? This week the SDI program has turned 10. It has already required more than \$30 billion. Its main idea was to provide an anti-missile umbrella for the United States. The original concept is now being reconsidered. The SDI will have more limited aims. Yet, one cannot but ask a number of questions posed by further work on the program because the likely emergence of space weapons is the sword of Damocles over the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the basis for all other strategic nuclear arms agreements. One is bound to ask why it is necessary for the Americans to speed up work on the Star Wars project now that Moscow and Washington have agreed to cut their nuclear arsenals by two-thirds by the year 2003. There is one more question: Is there any reason for continuing research into SDI at a time when Russia and the United States have agreed to look into the possibility of a global defense against ballistic missiles? Experts in both countries have already started working on the project. The main idea of the project is to unite the United States, Russia, and other countries to make a global umbrella that would make them secure against likely terrorist or extremist actions. The new situation in the world produces new ideas. What looked like an adequate response to current threats in the period of East-West nuclear confrontation, say 10 years ago, is completely irrelevant now. Ridding the world of nuclear arms and using space for peaceful purposes are in the forefront these days. One of the brain fathers of the Star Wars program, physicist Edward Teller of the United States, suggests reconsidering the project in order to build a ground, airborne, and space system to monitor the condition of the environment around the world. Russian scientists have supported the proposal. In science and in politics one has to be able to see many years ahead. Instead of the Star Wars plan, priority must be given to peace on earth and in space.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Russian Defense Minister Calls for New CFE Quotas Within Russia

*MK1203111493 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
No 3, 11 Mar 93 p 6*

[Pavel Felgengauer article: "New Difficulties Over Treaty on Arms Reductions in Europe. Russia Will Press for Reapportionment of Quota Allocated"]

[Text] The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) has a long and difficult history. The negotiations on mutual reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe began in Vienna back in 1973 and continued for 16 years without serious success. Significantly, one of the most difficult issues in the talks was the exact numbers of Soviet heavy weapons in Europe. Western countries suspected the USSR authorities of deliberate cheating. Some former Soviet military experts, however, who know the problem

"from the inside," are sure that the top Soviet political leadership also did not know the real number of heavy weapons in their own army.

In 1989, "under Gorbachev," talks began on the CFE and in October 1990 the treaty was signed in Paris. En route to the signing, however, the USSR was forced to "correct" the quantity of military hardware (according to Western estimates, up to 70,000 units of heavy weaponry had been evacuated to Siberia and Central Asia). No sooner had the Paris treaty come into force, however, than the USSR fell apart and immediately 10 newly independent states started claiming the quota that had been allotted to the Union.

As a result of difficult negotiations in the summer of 1992 in Tashkent an interstate protocol on quotas was signed. Russia is by 1995 to reduce its armaments in its European part down to 6,400 tanks, 11,480 armored combat vehicles, 6,415 artillery systems, 3,450 combat aircraft and 890 combat helicopters. A new problem, however, has recently emerged: regional armaments quotas. A mere 14 percent of tanks and 5.5 percent of armored combat vehicles (in regular army units) were allocated to the "flank regions" (Leningrad Military District and the North Caucasus Military District). The North Caucasus District is now becoming one of the Russian Army's most important, however, and the allocated quota is definitely not enough.

Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told a SEGODNYA correspondent that "owing to the changes in the situation, new quotas are required: It will be necessary to relocate weapons from one district to another, while preserving the overall agreed level." Russian Foreign Ministry experts, however, believe that this will be "very hard" to do.

Latvian Chief Envoy in Talks With Russia Interviewed

*MK2303130693 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Mar 93 p 3*

[Interview with State Minister Yanis Dinevics, head of the Latvian delegation to Russian-Latvian negotiations, by Vitaliy Portnikov; place and date not given: "There Is No Person in Russia Ready To Sign Treaty With Latvia. Latvian State Minister Yanis Dinevics on Talks With Russia"]

[Text] The latest round of Latvian-Russian talks that just ended in Moscow has given the Latvian side no answer to the main questions—about the schedule for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Latvia and the settlement of property problems. Although the sides, as before, managed to agree on some specific questions, and to initial, among others, agreements on railroad transit through Latvian territory of troops and military cargo, on procedures for the use of Latvian airspace by Russian military aviation, on procedures for crossing the Latvian border by the Russian military, on procedures for Russian military vessels to sail in Latvian territorial waters.... The majority of these agreements, however, are meant for the interim period, whereas the negotiating process between the neighboring countries is a permanent phenomenon. This is why I asked State Minister Yanis Dinevics, leader of the

Latvian delegation at the negotiations with the Russian Federation, to reflect on whether this process will not be affected by the ongoing election campaign in Latvia.

"Undoubtedly," Yanis Dinevics replied. "There is little time for the talks. My approach, however, is this: Regardless of whether I will be in the next government, this is something for which we are responsible. Even if it has to be transferred to somebody else, we must do everything to ensure that nobody can reproach us. This is why we have moved on to drafting particular agreements and this is why we are trying to conduct these rounds of talks to the best of our ability."

Portnikov: How do you assess the tactics of the Russian delegation?

Dinevics: I cannot say anything especially good. I have this impression: If there is no clarity within the Russian power structures, there will be no man who would dare to sign a comprehensive treaty with Latvia.

Portnikov: Does this mean that dialogue is proceeding between two structures that are not confident of their viability?

Dinevics: Mine is a somewhat different situation: My functions were approved at a plenary session of the Supreme Council; I have the authority to sign treaties, whereas Russian delegation leader Sergey Zotov is merely a Foreign Ministry officer with no authority.

Portnikov: Still, a Foreign Ministry official is not affected by changes in the structures of power, while your powers are limited by the upcoming parliamentary elections in Latvia. How do you think these elections will proceed? In Estonia the "rightists" came to power; in Lithuania, the "leftists;" while Latvia is traditionally "in the middle" of the Baltics....

Dinevics: In the elections we could also find ourselves in the middle. I do not think that a situation is possible here whereby one party, as happened in Lithuania, will get majority support. After the elections certain coalitions will need to be formed.

Portnikov: And whose side will the non-Latvian citizens favor? Does it not seem to you that the political elite has lost these voters—compared with the atmosphere of the poll that confirmed Latvia's state independence?

Dinevics: I do not think that the voters who are Russian citizens of Latvia have any problems whatsoever. They will make their choice based on their sympathies and paying main attention to social problems.

Portnikov: And still those forces that undoubtedly exist in Latvia and outside and that would like to turn the republic into a kind of satellite of the neighboring state are making preparations not even for these but for the next elections, apparently counting on the discontent among this non-Latvian part of your country's population....

Dinevics: This trend exists. Our government is a government of the doomed. The next government will also have

very serious difficulties. And in the face of such difficulties attaining a high credibility rating will be very problematical. [Dinevics ends]

Sergey Zotov, leader of the Russian delegation at the negotiations with Latvia, stated that the most serious result of the latest round was the reaching of an agreement on the fate of former military enterprises located on Latvian territory. Apparently, their resources will be used to create joint Russian-Latvian ventures, while military production will be converted.

Sergey Zotov stipulated three conditions under which the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia may be resumed: The recognition of the status of Russian troops stationed on Latvia's territory; Latvia's agreement that a deadline of before 1993 is unacceptable to the Russian side; and the clearing up of the fate of strategic facilities and Russian property on the territory of the Latvian Republic. Sergey Zotov again accused the Latvian side of taking unlawful actions with regard to the troops and also reminded journalists about certain statements by Latvian politicians which in his opinion have an anti-Russian orientation. Protection of human rights in Latvia will remain part of Russia's international policy, the leader of the Russian delegation at the talks with Latvia stressed.

Grachev Says Russian Withdrawal From Baltics Suspended

Comments at NACC Meeting

OW2903185793 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1847 GMT 29 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia is suspending the pull out of its troops from the Baltic states, Pavel Grachev, Russia's Defense Minister, told a session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Brussels Monday [29 March]. He explained this by saying that "Russia did not succeed in signing accords with the Baltic countries on the sequence, conditions, and schedule of the withdrawal or on social security for the servicemen."

Following his speech Hain Rebas, Estonian Defense Minister, and Audrius Butkevicius, his Lithuanian counterpart, made a joint statement that this decision was in conflict with international law and Russia's earlier commitments.

Defense ministers of the U.S., Britain, Norway, Iceland, and Canada also responded sharply to Grachev's statement. They said that they understood the difficulties Russia encounters in the pull out but these difficulties do not justify the suspension.

By some accounts, there are a total of about 35,000 Russian troops in the Baltic countries.

Official Explains Grachev Statement

OW3003142693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1343 GMT 30 Mar 93

[Reports prepared by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, and

others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—
Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There is nothing unexpected in the statement concerning Russian troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries, made by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Brussels, said Aleksandr Udaltsov, deputy chief of the Russian Foreign Ministry's 2nd European department, in an interview with Interfax's correspondent on Tuesday [30 March].

Addressing NATO's Cooperation Council on Monday, the defense minister said that the withdrawal of Russian troops had been suspended.

In comments on the excited reaction of Lithuania and other Baltic states to Grachev's statement, Interfax's interviewee said: "I'd like to remind you that on October 29 last year President Boris Yeltsin signed a directive to suspend the withdrawal of troops from the Baltic countries till the signing of corresponding agreements. This relates primarily to the principal agreement on troops withdrawal, plus agreements on social guarantees for the servicemen, their family members and military retirees."

"Unfortunately, none of the three republics (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia - INTERFAX) has signed such agreements," Udaltsov noted.

According to him, the stormy reaction of the Baltic countries to the defense minister's statement can be explained in the following way: "Evidently they hoped that President Yeltsin's directive will not be complied with consistently enough, and they'll manage to procrastinate the process of signing agreements. For our part, we made it clear enough that this kind of situation cannot last forever, and that such agreements have to be signed."

As the high-ranking diplomat said, the importance of signing agreements promptly has been demonstrated once again. "With the signing of agreements the schedule signed with Lithuania will not be disrupted, and the times for withdrawing troops from Latvia and Estonia will be fixed sooner," he said.

When asked by Interfax what hinders the endeavors to sign agreements on troops withdrawal as soon as possible, Udaltsov said: "As for Lithuania, our talks on the level of governmental delegations with it were suspended five months ago. As you know, the election marathon in Lithuania proved to be too long. At first they were electing the parliament, later the government, then the president, and now the government again. President Algirdas Brazauskas approved the new members of Lithuania's governmental delegation only last Friday. We believe that in the next few days we'll renew negotiations with the Lithuanians and deal with the wordings of these agreements. If we manage to thrash them out and sign the agreements, there will be no problems in implementing the schedule, which, as a matter of fact, has been observed on the whole. But as regards Latvia and Estonia, the process of drafting agreements proceeds with difficulties there. For instance, at the latest round of talks with Estonia our partners unexpectedly

put on the table an actually new version of the draft agreement on troops withdrawal, which had been coordinated by almost 90%."

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Concerned

OW2903191793 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1847 GMT
29 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "News received from Brussels raises our concern," in such a way the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys commented on the statement of the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. The Defense Minister's statement, in his interview with our Baltfax correspondent on Monday [29 March] evening, concerned Russia's intention to suspend the withdrawal of its forces from the Baltic states.

The leader of the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry noted that he understands the difficulties experienced by the Russian side related to accommodation and social guarantees for the forces withdrawn from the Baltic states. However, he said, such a statement arouses concern and is a new sign, as until now Russia has not openly stated that it intends suspending the withdrawal of the Russian Army from the Baltic states.

Gylys added that he is awaiting explanations from the Russian plenipotentiary Ambassador to Lithuania Nikolay Obertyshev with whom the Lithuanian Foreign Minister intends to meet on Tuesday morning.

Ministry Voices 'Concern'

OW3003114693 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1043 GMT
30 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Monday [29 March] evening the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry issued a statement voicing concern with the change of Russia's official stand. The document was prompted by a speech of the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Brussels where he announced the suspension of the withdrawal of troops from Baltic states.

The statement says that Russia is violating the schedule of withdrawal from Lithuania signed by the two defense ministers on September 8, 1992 as well as the Helsinki political declaration and the December 18, 1992 statement of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council saying that the pullout cannot be linked with other matters.

The announcement in Brussels aroused a sharp reaction in Lithuania. The speaker of parliament has told MPs [members of parliament] that on Monday evening President Brazauskas held a special meeting on the issue which suggested waiting for the return from Brussels of Defense Minister Butkevicius and making a decision after hearing his point.

On Tuesday morning the Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys invited the Russian ambassador to Vilnius Nikolay Obertyshev and demanded explanations concerning the official Russian stand.

Lithuanian Minister Summons Russian Ambassador

*LD3003123893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1037 GMT 30 Mar 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius, 30 Mar—Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys has demanded that Nikolay Obertyshev, Russia's ambassador to Lithuania, inform him immediately on the official position of the Russian government with regard to the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from well-informed sources in the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry that today the head of the foreign policy department invited him to his office and asked for explanations in connection with the speech made by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev yesterday in Brussels at a meeting of defense ministers of the member-states of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, of Eastern Europe and of the former USSR republics.

As is known, the head of Russia's military department said in Brussels that Russia is suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states, which caused a negative reaction in the capitals of the Baltic states.

"The Lithuanian foreign minister reminded the Russian ambassador that such a unilateral decision by Moscow violates the Lithuanian-Russian agreement of 8 September 1992 on the final withdrawal of troops from Lithuania by 31 August 1993 and that this operation can in no way be linked to other issues." He requested the official position of the Russian government on this issue.

Estonian Prime Minister Comments

*OW3003173593 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1626 GMT
30 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar believes that it is necessary to seriously consider the statement of the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev about suspension of forces withdrawal from the Baltic state.

In his interview with Baltfax Laar said: "Earlier Russia has already voiced identical statements, nevertheless the process of forces withdrawal was continuing." The Premier views the present statement as "a reflection of inter-political struggle in Russia" and believes that "it deserves more serious consideration than the previous ones."

As it is known, saying that "Russia has failed to conclude agreements on principles, conditions, and the schedule of forces withdrawal from the Baltic states and agreements on social protection of servicemen," on Monday [30 March] Pavel Grachev declared about suspension in forces withdrawal from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the conference of the NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] held in Brussels.

According to Laar, Russia is actually deviating from discussing problems related to withdrawal of its forces at the

Russian-Estonian inter-state negotiations. Laar says that Russia is toughening its position and Estonia cannot make any concessions.

Russian Supreme Soviet To Discuss Statement

*OW3003190493 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1758 GMT
30 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On March 30 at the plenary sitting of the Supreme Soviet the majority of deputies supported the proposal to discuss the situation due to the statement on interim suspension of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Baltic states voiced by the Russian Minister Pavel Grachev.

To clarify the position of the Russian side, the adviser of the Russian Ambassador to Riga Valeriy Nesterushkin was invited to the Latvian Foreign Ministry on March 30. He had a conversation with the director of Latvian Foreign Ministry's eastern relations department Aivars Vovers who declared that according to the Latvian party, the statement of the Russian Minister does not correspond to the Russian Federation's related obligations to the United Nations Organization and the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In his turn, the Embassy's representative answered that according to the Russian side, Grachev's statement does not contradict the Decree of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin on an interim suspension of troops withdrawal from the Baltic states signed last year.

The press center of the Northern-Western Group of Russian forces reported to Baltfax on March 30 that the group of forces had not received any special instructions tied to the Minister's statement.

Lithuania Hopeful on Withdrawal Schedule

*OW3003190393 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1757 GMT
30 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian Home Guard Minister Audrius Butkevicius expressed the hope that "it will be possible to withdraw the Russian army from Lithuania before August 31, the date envisaged by the Lithuanian-Russian treaty." The Minister voiced this statement on Tuesday [30 March] on his return from Brussels, where he participated at the meeting of NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] Defense Ministers, to Vilnius.

Responding to journalists' questions, the leader of the Lithuanian Defense Ministry reported that speaking in the Belgian capital, the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev voiced a statement about the suspension of the Russian-army withdrawal from the Baltic states. Pavel Grachev pointed to the absence of agreements with the Baltic states on the final withdrawal of the army as the major reason of this suspension.

Butkevicius noted the Russian Defense Minister's statement aroused a sharp reaction from the Defense Ministers of the United States, Great Britain, Norway, Iceland, and other countries.

Lithuania's Home Guard Minister reported that he had a conversation with Grachev following his statement and drew attention to the fact that Lithuania had already concluded a deposited treaty with Russia according to which Russia is obliged to withdraw its army from Lithuania's territory. In addition, Lithuania's decrees determine social guarantees for Russia's servicemen and there are no grounds to raise this issue.

Speaking about Lithuania's possible moves, as a counteraction to this statement, Butkevicius stressed the necessity to determine where the Russian party violates, by analogical statements as well, the international treaties, to inform the international organizations, and to act through the diplomatic channels.

Our Baltfax correspondent reports that on Tuesday evening the Home Guard Minister Butkevicius met with the Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas. A decision on an official reaction of the Lithuanian leadership to the Russian Defense Minister's statement will be adopted after this meeting.

Lithuanian Defense Minister Interviewed

*LD3003155493 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1335 GMT 30 Mar 93*

[Excerpt] National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius returned to Vilnius today. Birute Vysniauskaite met him at the airport:

[Vysniauskaite] Lithuanian National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius returned to Vilnius today. He took part in a conference of foreign ministers of the central and east European states and of NATO which took place in Brussels. As is known, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said at the conference that the pullout of troops from the Baltic states has been suspended.

Commenting on this statement, Audrius Butkevicius said that this was the first public statement by the Russian representative that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic has been suspended. The reason given was that the Baltic states did not have agreements on the final withdrawal of the troops.

Immediately after the statement Audrius Butkevicius met with Pavel Grachev and explained to him that Lithuania has agreements with Russia under which obligations were undertaken by Russia to withdraw the troops and that this agreement has been desposited [deponuoti].

Second, we have defined the social guarantees of the Russian servicemen by the laws of our state. Therefore, there are no grounds to raise this problem again.

There is no doubt that this statement by Pavel Grachev was coordinated with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Speaking about the meeting with the Russian defense minister, Audrius Butkevicius said:

[Begin recording] [Butkevicius] We discussed the situation with regard to the withdrawal of the Russian troops, and

without elaborating too much I can say that I am optimistic and I think that the Russian troops will actually be withdrawn by 31 August.

Our colleagues from the United States, British Defense Minister Rifkind, Norwegian Defense Minister Holst, and the Icelandic defense minister also reacted. It must be said that the Russian stand is changing. However, this is not new. This change took place about five months ago and we put this change on record. It has been presented to parliament in the report-back by the negotiation delegation with Russia. Now we have clearcut statements by the Russian leaders.

However, two policies should be separated and that is the policy which is being expressed and the practical policy which is being carried out. Therefore, I would like to say again that I am optimistic and I believe that we will manage to have the Russian troops withdrawn by 31 August.

First of all it must be clearly established which international agreements have been violated and to inform those international organizations of which both Lithuania and Russia are members, and the resolutions which have been violated by the above statement.

Third [as heard], there are a number of diplomatic channels through which actions can be taken in Russia and we are already doing this and we will continue to do this. I hope we will succeed. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Further Butkevicius Remarks

*LD3103133893 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 31 Mar 93*

[Report by Birute Vysniauskaite]

[Text] Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius held bilateral meetings in Brussels with the U.S. deputy defense secretary. He promised to present the Lithuanian stance to President Bill Clinton so that he can inform Russian President Boris Yeltsin about them during their meeting in Vancouver.

Butkevicius also had meetings with the foreign ministers of Norway, Great Britain, Canada, and Germany. The list of Lithuania's problems was presented to all of them.

The Western states can see that the withdrawal of Russian troops is the litmus test indicating how the processes in Russia are proceeding.

Should this statement be seen as pressure on Lithuania? Audrius Butkevicius said pressure on Lithuania and the Baltic states is natural, however, the pressure is also directed toward Eastern Europe and the NATO states as well.

A statement was issued yesterday by the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry and a note has already been prepared asking the Russian Foreign Ministry to explain the situation. Actions with Estonia and Latvia are being coordinated.

This is what Audrius Butkevicius told Lithuanian Radio after the news conference:

[Begin recording] [Vysniauskaite] Esteemed minister, the impression given by your news conference is that you are voicing purely your personal position. What is the position adopted by our state?

[Butkevicius] At the news conference I was presenting the stance of the state. However, I am pleased that you found it rather like my personal view. In fact, this is a coordinated stance which was adopted while discussing the above issues.

[Vysniauskaite] According to Mr. Kavaliauskas, our president said yesterday that Mr. Grachev's statement is linked with the situation in Russia and with the referendum which is due in April. As an experienced negotiator with Russia, do you think Lithuania currently has enough connections and measures to change our situation or to help our situation if Yeltsin loses the referendum?

[Butkevicius] One can never say whether there are enough connections, measures, and possibilities available. What I can say, however, is that we have more of them today than ever before. [end recording]

Lithuanian Official Doubts Timely Withdrawal

OW3003192193 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1626 GMT
30 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Colonel Stasys Knezys, a representative of the Lithuanian government in charge of Russian forces withdrawal, is not sure if Russia will completely leave Lithuania before August 31, 1993, in accordance with the schedule agreed to by the parties, after the statement of the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on suspension of forces withdrawal.

Knezys told Baltfax that he still has no information concerning implementation of Grachev's statement. At the same time he pointed out that at least a week is needed to see the first signs of a reaction "to the new position of the Russian Defense Ministry" on the part of forces stationed in Lithuania.

Latvian Defense Minister Comments

OW3103123693 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1226 GMT
31 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At the recent conference of the NATO defense ministers in Brussels, the Latvian and Russian defense ministers reached an agreement in principle to hold a bilateral meeting in the near future. Latvian Defense Minister Talavs Jundzis announced this on Tuesday at a press conference dedicated to the results of the meeting.

The time and place of the meeting will be coordinated later, he said.

Commenting on the statement by Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev who said that Russia was suspending its troops pullout from the Baltics, Jundzis suggested that General Grachev was just trying to procure more funds from the West to implement the housing projects for the officers withdrawn from that region.

He said he was sure the pullout of the Russian troops would be continued, adding, however, that the situation when the countries are not bound by any special agreement in that

regard is "extraordinary" because it threatens independence in Latvia and the Baltic region as a whole.

Protests Over Grachev Statement Described

MK3103093093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 31 Mar 93 p 1

[Natalya Pachegina article: "Moscow Suspends Withdrawal of Troops From Baltics. Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn Link This to Changes in Internal Political Situation in Russia"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Immediately after Pavel Grachev's statement [on a pause in the pullout of troops from the Baltic states] the defense ministers of Estonia and Lithuania, Hain Rebas and Audrys Butkavichyus, issued a joint statement saying that this decision contradicts Russia's commitments and the international treaties it has signed.

There has also been sharp reaction to Grachev's statement from defense ministers of the United States, Great Britain, Norway, Iceland, and Canada.

According to reports from Tallinn, this statement has also come as a surprise to Russian Foreign Ministry personnel. They recall Boris Yeltsin's November threat to suspend the withdrawal of troops from other Baltic states, which never materialized, and they believe that this time the troops' withdrawal will indeed be suspended.

Yuri Luyk, head of the Estonian delegation at the Estonian-Russian talks, having said that according to Russia, there are 35,000 Russian army servicemen, suggested that this statement undermines Estonian-Russian relations and means a deliberate evasion of the fulfillment of the agreements whereby Russia undertook to withdraw its troops within the shortest possible term. He believes that the reason for the turn in Russia's policy lies in the change of the internal political situation in the Russian Federation. Grachev's statement, he pointed out, is surprising since it is precisely now that many Western countries, the G-7, and the EC have decided to give Russia greater financial assistance.

"Estonia has an unequivocal position on this issue, which I will express today (30 March) during my meeting with chief Russian negotiator Vasilii Svirin," said Luyk.

Commenting on Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's statement concerning the suspension of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia owing to the fact that no agreement has been concluded, Vinkelis Peteris, press attache of the Latvian Republic, observed that there is no agreement on the presence of Russian troops on the territory of the Baltic states either. In this kind of situation Latvia, citing the absence of a corresponding agreement, could for its part take certain moves directed at expediting the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory.

The press attache added, however, that despite statements of this type coming out from time to time, the withdrawal of Russian troops continues. According to him, as of today approximately 50 percent of Russian army servicemen have been pulled out of Latvia. Nonetheless, Peteris believes that such statements cannot but evoke a certain concern, especially in the context of ongoing developments in Russia.

"Fortunately, up to now the Russian military's words have not been backed by their deeds," the press attache said, summing up the situation.

Pavel Grachev's statement has caused dismay among the Russian delegation at talks with Estonia, sources at the Estonian Embassy in Moscow said—especially given that after a similar statement last November the procedure for the troop withdrawal was not breached (at present some 50 percent have been withdrawn from Estonia). The Estonian Embassy said it does not have any more detailed information. [passage omitted]

Lithuania Awaits Explanation

LD3103202993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1846 GMT 31 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius March 31 TASS—"We are greatly concerned with the statement by Pavel Grachev, Russian defence minister, which he made in Brussels, that Russia suspends withdrawal of its troops from the Baltic states. We are waiting for an official explanation from the Russian Foreign Ministry as to Russia's true approach to the issue, but we have not received it so far," Povilas Gylys, Lithuanian foreign minister, told ITAR-TASS.

Lithuanian leaders have repeatedly made clear their position. "We are keeping to the Russo-Lithuanian agreements, signed in September 1992 in Moscow, about the ultimate withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania until August 31, 1993. At the same time, I must underline that the withdrawal of Russian troops is going on for the time being and it has not been suspended so far," the minister said.

"We are aware of the present situation in Russia, but Lithuania cannot disregard such statements, because they are touching upon its vitally important interests. We are still waiting for an official explanation on the part of the Russian Foreign Ministry," Gylys stressed.

More Butkevicius Remarks

OW3103214193 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1751 GMT 31 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Wednesday [31 March] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania sent Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note containing a request for an explanation. The request concerned the announcement by the Minister of Defense of Russia Pavel Grachev, made in Brussels, that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states is to be temporarily stopped.

In response to the question asked by the "Baltfax" correspondent at a Wednesday press-conference in Vilnius the Minister of Regional Defence of Lithuania Audrius Butkevicius informed that the decision to send the note was taken at a presidential meeting participated in by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Povilas Gylys.

The Minister of Regional Defence rendered the declaration by P. Grachev on the withdrawal of troops "unprecedented" and said it was an absolutely new, publicly formulated, at an

international forum, Russian position on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic countries. He said, P. Grachev's statement attracted attention worldwide.

A. Butkevicius informed that he had met with P. Grachev before the latter made his statement. The minister expressed hope, based on the discussion, that the withdrawal of troops would be completed within the period determined by the bilateral schedule, that is by August this year. He supported his opinion by references to the assurances made by Russian diplomats of readiness to comply with the agreements concluded and by the fact of the continuation of the withdrawal.

A. Butkevicius also accentuated that Lithuania received no official confirmation of the withdrawal being stopped and recommended differentiating between the "politics of words and the politics of action."

Lithuanian President, Ministers Meet

LD3103231793 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 31 Mar 93

[Text] At a meeting yesterday with the ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas said that the statement by Pavel Grachev was linked more to Russia's international situation, notably before the referendum.

The participants discussed how Lithuania should respond to the statement. According to Audrius Butkevicius, on 29 March the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry responded with a statement and a note was sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry today. In addition, actions are being coordinated with other Baltic states.

Lithuanian Officials on Treaties

PM0103092193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich: "Lithuania Does Not Accept Russian Defense Minister's Arguments"]

[Text] Russian Defense Minister P. Grachev's statement at the session of the defense ministers of NATO and East European countries regarding the intention to suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states has generated a stormy reaction in Lithuania.

Scarcely had the news arrived from Brussels, where the session was held, before the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry summoned N. Obertyshev, Russian ambassador to Lithuania, and demanded that he give explanations: Is the defense minister's statement the official position of the Russian leadership or the personal view of the head of the military department? Protest statements poured in from many Lithuanian parties and movements and the influential right-wing opposition. On his return from Brussels, however, National Defense Minister A. Butkevicius, noting the unsoundness of P. Grachev's arguments regarding the need first to sign a relevant treaty with Lithuania and to provide social guarantees for officers, was not so pessimistic and expressed the conviction that the Russian troops will be withdrawn from Lithuania according to schedule by 31 August this year. Essentially he tried to dash the wave of

anger caused by P. Grachev's statement and denied press reports that Russia does not intend to fulfill the agreement it has signed on the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania, especially as P. Grachev did not mention Lithuania in his statement.

As for the allegedly unsigned treaties on the withdrawal of troops, the Lithuanian defense minister recalled that a treaty has been signed between Lithuania and Russia on the terms and schedule for the withdrawal of the troops (to be precise, what has been signed is a consular convention and a schedule for the troops' withdrawal with two additional protocols to the latter document—on the procedure for resolving technical and organizational questions and on the rules of conduct of the units that are being withdrawn. Incidentally, it was the two countries' defense ministers who signed them. But a political treaty, which is a broader political document on the troop withdrawal, has not been signed—N.L.). Therefore Lithuania is perplexed: Surely an unsigned political agreement does not give the right to cancel other accords backed by the defense ministers' signatures?

Landsbergis Comments

*WS0104094193 Tallinn BNS in English 0745 GMT
1 Apr 93*

[Text] Vilnius, Mar 31, BNS—The statement on the suspension of the Russian military withdrawal from the Baltic states is a new method of pressuring Lithuania and the West, Lithuanian opposition leader said.

Russia is constantly "checking the reaction of western countries with its threatening statements," Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the opposition, says in a statement circulated Wednesday [31 March]. Weak reaction "induces Russian politicians with an empire way of thinking to new threats and expansionist intents."

Russia's refusal to observe the army withdrawal schedule on the background of a political crisis in Russia "could mean hopes for considerable financial aid from the West," Landsbergis says.

"If greater concern about the fate of the Baltic states and the withdrawal of Russian troops will not be expressed by the West at the Vancouver summit, Russia's expansionists will interpret this in a way useful to themselves", the statement says.

Latvian Envoy: 'Nothing New' in Grachev Statement

*MK0304120093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Apr 93 p 3*

[NEGA report: "Russia's Military Received No New Directives. There Is Nothing New in Grachev's Statement"]

[Text] Between 10,000 and 12,000 Russian soldiers can be withdrawn from Latvia during 1993, stated Janis Dinevich, head of Latvia's delegation at the Latvia-Russia talks on the army pullout. Nearly 27,000 Russian army servicemen are in Latvia at present.

Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev's statement on halting the army pullout from the Baltics, which he made in

Brussels during the conference of defense ministers of NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries, does not contain, in the opinion of Janis Dinevich, anything new, since it is a logical result of the decision by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 on halting the army withdrawal. "Grachev's statement is explained by Russia's desire to draw Western countries' attention to such economic problems as the construction of housing for Russia's officers," Dinevich thinks.

He also intimated that Russian Army troops in Latvia had received no new directives and instructions, and recognized that Leonid Mayorov, commander of the Northwest Group of Forces, understands the situation that has been created in connection with the Russian Army's presence, and that he is contributing, within the limits of what is possible, to the troop withdrawal.

An official statement by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes the positive positions expressed in U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's CBS television interview.

The statement says that Christopher did not criticize Baltic countries specifically, and he did not say that violations of human rights are allowed there, since it was the former USSR as a whole that was being discussed.

The statement also notes that the United States has never recognized violations of human rights in the Baltics, and that the American side is worried over social problems rather than human rights violations.

Latvia's Foreign Ministry fully agrees with the U.S. secretary of state's stance on the observance of human rights and the rights of social and national minorities in the former USSR as a whole.

Belarusian Military Experts Inspect NATO Units

*WS3003113293 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 0300 GMT 30 Mar 93*

[Text] The Belarusian military has entered a European scale event into the history of the young Belarusian Armed Forces. On 29 March, for the first time, a military delegation of the Belarusian National Center for Control and Inspections arrived in France. Under the provisions of the European Conventional Weapons Treaty [CFE], the delegation will scrupulously inspect the staff and authorized weapons of NATO units chosen for inspection by the Belarusian Ministry of Defense. For the first time, a Belarusian military plane with officers on board landed at a NATO airfield, which up until now has been closed for CIS controllers.

Belarus Begins Destruction of MiG-27s Under CFE Treaty

*LD0104141193 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1236 GMT 1 Apr 93*

[By BELINFORM-TASS correspondent Leonid Tratsvskiy]

[Text] Minsk, 1 Apr—In accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) ratified by its parliament, the Republic of Belarus has started destroying MiG-27 operational aircraft.

The first fuselage of a previously dismantled aircraft was cut up at the "Lesnaya" military base near the town of Baranovichi today; the operation was monitored by a group of NATO inspectors. A BELINFORM correspondent was told at the Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspections that disassembled spares, joints, and materials would be sold through the commercial directorate of the Republican Defense Ministry to state and cooperative enterprises and firms. Ten aircraft of this type are to be destroyed at the first stage.

Hard Currency Payments Possible for Russian Pullout From Baltics

MK0204125293 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Apr 93 p 3

[Aleksandr Gushchin report under general headline: "Troop Withdrawal: Moscow's New Political Decision. Assessments of Pavel Grachev's Brussels Statement Get Harsher"]

[Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev believes that the question of Russian troop withdrawal from Estonia and Latvia will not be resolved until the defense ministers of these states reach agreement among themselves.

Estonian Defense Minister Hain Rebas says he is prepared for such a meeting. The discussion, in his view, should focus on the questions of financing the pullout of Russian troops and providing social guarantees to servicemen, including retirees, of the former Soviet Army.

Ants Laaneots, chief of the Main Staff of the Estonian Defense Forces, who is also acting commander in chief of the Estonian Army, told a NEGA correspondent that the problems of the Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states fall under the jurisdiction of politicians, not the military. At the same time, he noted that the presence of the Russian military in Estonia would affect Russian taxpayers. Once the national Estonian currency is introduced, all payments for utilities would have to be made by the Russian military units in hard currency. Thus Russia has already run up a substantial debt to be repaid to Estonia, and every day of the Russian troops' stay in Estonia makes this debt larger...

Reports on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania

Lithuanian Reports to NATO

LD2603154493 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 26 Mar 93

[Text] Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius was received at the NATO headquarters in Brussels yesterday by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. The defense minister informed the NATO secretary general about the process of withdrawing the Russian Army from Lithuania. They exchanged views on the political situation in Russia and cooperation between the Republic of Lithuania and NATO.

Today the defense minister also met with Ambassador von Moltke, NATO assistant secretary for political affairs, and with Michael Legge, assistant secretary for defense, politics, and planning.

Today Minister Audrius Butkevicius goes to Stuttgart to meet with General Charles Boyd, deputy commander of US Armed Forces in Europe.

Estonian Defense Minister Pleased With Grachev Proposal

OW3103201393 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1956 GMT 31 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonian Defence Minister Hain Rebas told Baltfax that he was happy about his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev's proposal to negotiate the issue of Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states saying he was prepared to do so.

Commenting on Grachev's statement that Lithuania showed proper understanding of the withdrawal issue, Rebas said Russia was still upholding the principle of divide and rule. He said it looked as if a vigorous offensive was being made on Latvia instead of Estonia as the case was last summer, said the Estonian Defence Minister.

Russian General Says Withdrawal on Schedule

OW0104215893 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1836 GMT
1 Apr 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania goes according to schedule, stated the Ministry of Defense of Russia Representative, General Major Sergey Petrov, who is in charge of the withdrawal.

At the March, 31 meeting with the plenipotentiary of the Lithuania Government on troop-withdrawal issues, Stasys Knezys, the Russian general, informed that he has no orders so far to halt the withdrawal of troops.

S. Knezys says the tempo of the pull-out over the last weeks has been quite high. Since the schedule was endorsed on September 8 last year, approximately 40 percent of all troops have returned to Russia. Currently about 14 thousand troops remain on the territory of the republic, making up 4 divisions and 50 minor units.

In an interview to the "Respublika" newspaper S. Knezys said that the command of some units being withdrawn have requested permission for some unarmed troops to enter the republic to assist in the preparation for the withdrawal. S. Knezys said such permission shall be granted "should Russia's military abide by their obligations."

He says, he would rather allow 300 unarmed soldiers into the republic than tolerate the presence of whole regiments for an additional 2-3 months.

Withdrawal Pace Increased

LD0504141693 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 5 Apr 93

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian military equipment from Lithuania increased significantly in March and it will not

decrease in April, said Lieutenant Colonel Algirdas Jurkevicius, head of the Inspectorate for Transporting Military and Dangerous Cargoes at the Ministry of National Defense.

Almost 700 rail cars with military equipment left Lithuania in March, that is, about 300 cars more than in February. Since October last year, when the Russian troops started moving eastward, about 4,700 rail cars have left Lithuania. During the same period 227 rail cars entered Lithuania. These were mainly tankers with fuel and other materials. Ten of these cars entered Lithuanian in February and March.

According to Lt. Col. Algirdas Jurkevicius, there has been no pause in the withdrawal of the troops. As before, requests signed by Colonel General Mayorov are coming on time from Riga to Vilnius to withdraw new batches of military equipment.

Over recent months military transit through the territory of Lithuania has also increased. In March 913 rail cars with military equipment passed through the territory of Lithuania going from Germany to Russia, while during the first months of this year this figure was on average about 600 a month.

The transit from Russia to Kaliningrad Oblast is also increasing: from 82 rail cars in January to 232 in March. It must be said that during the three months of this year the amount of military equipment transported to Kaliningrad Oblast is two times less than during the last quarter of the previous year. At that time 958 rail cars were needed to transport the equipment, while now 246 rail cars are needed.

In general, only about one-third of the military cargo planned for transporting is actually moved in transit by Russian servicemen.

Military equipment is also transported to Kaliningrad Oblast from Latvia and Estonia: about 400 rail cars this year. During the last three last months of last year this number was almost 500.

Equipment is also sent back to Russia from Kaliningrad: 570 rail cars during the last quarter of last year and 530 rail cars this year.

Landsbergis Wants Russia Pressured

*LD0504120793 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 5 Apr 93*

[Text] Commenting on the troop withdrawal and relations with Russia at a news conference earlier today, Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of the opposition Tevynes Santara faction, said the Lithuanian leadership should have its own plan ready in case the situation in Russia suddenly changes and a threat to Lithuania arises. Lithuania should at least discuss an appeal to the United Nations and NATO concerning the use of peacekeeping forces, as has already been done by Estonia.

Commenting on this, Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys asked whether pressuring Russia would help stabilize the situation. The foreign minister said Lithuania's calm behavior was also approved in Strasbourg.

Going back to Vytautas Landsbergis' news conference, the opposition leader disseminated a statement concerning the agreements on the withdrawal of Russian troops. The statement says:

The Russian Foreign Ministry stated once again in its 2 April statement this year that Russia does not have signed agreements on the withdrawal of troops. It is difficult to explain this level of incompetence (?unless) [word indistinct] is incompetent and does not know about the signed agreements of 8 September 1992 between Lithuania and Russia which came into effect from the moment of signing and which has been registered with the United Nations.

International law is also mentioned in the above statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, which claims that it supports Russia's demands concerning servicemen's social security.

This is a complete misunderstanding, Vytautas Landsbergis said. The social security of Russian servicemen is the internal affair of sovereign Russia. Russia can appeal to all the states for help to accommodate the servicemen in their new places of deployment, but Lithuania has already appealed to the West to help Russia with its complete withdrawal of the troops of the former USSR from the Baltic states. However, an issue of international help cannot be confused with the norms of international law, Vytautas Landsbergis said in his statement.

Western Military Presence Viewed

*OW0504123793 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1106 GMT
5 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The current leadership, along with various political forces in Lithuania, should propose that the Russian government speed up the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory, and not prolong the procedure until 31 August 1993. Vytautas Landsbergis, leader of opposition factions in the Lithuanian Seimas, expressed this opinion at a press conference on Monday.

In addition to this, Landsbergis pointed to the necessity of appealing to the UN and NATO with the request that "if chaos happens in Russia, blue helmets are introduced in Lithuania from western states." Landsbergis argued that such a move could be necessary since "Russia constantly tries to put concluded agreements in doubt, including the one on troop withdrawal." In his words, attitudes in the Russian army are also dangerous, since the "officers' corps of the Russian army is gradually turning into an unconstitutional military part." In addition to this, the opposition leader mentioned that Russian troops had not taken an oath of loyalty to Russia.

Yeltsin on Delay in Troop Withdrawal From Baltics**Comment at Vancouver Summit***LD0504083393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0734 GMT
5 Apr 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Vancouver April 5 TASS—"We are completing the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania as Lithuania does not violate human rights and treats with respect the Russian-speaking population", President Boris Yeltsin said at a press conference on Sunday.

The pull out from Latvia and Estonia will depend on the human rights situation there, according to the president.

"As Latvia and Estonia violate human rights, as according to their legislation the national minorities, mostly Russians, are persecuted, we shall link the withdrawal schedule with the human rights situation there although we have adopted a political decision to pull the troops out of the republics", Yeltsin said.

Estonian Foreign Ministry Statement*LD0504161893 Tallinn Radio Estonia in English
1520 GMT 5 Apr 93*

[Excerpts] According to REUTER, a timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia will be linked to guarantees on the protection of the rights of ethnic Russians living there, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said on Sunday [4 April]. [passage omitted]

The Estonian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that the Russian position violated international norms of behavior. The Estonian Government interprets Russia's tactics of delaying the complete and unconditional withdrawal of its forces from the Baltics as an attempt to regain control over the Baltic states, it said.

The statement said that Russia, by claiming that human rights are being violated against in the Baltics, is consciously acting in defiance of opinions by experts from the United Nations, the CSCE, and the Council of Europe, who have said Estonia's democratic constitution and legislation are in compliance with international standards. The Estonian Government cannot accept that Armed Forces which constitute a threat to the security of Estonia as well as of the neighboring countries stayed on its territory longer than absolutely necessary for their withdrawal to Russia.

Estonian Negotiator Comments*OW0504194393 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1906 GMT
5 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Estonia was taken by surprise when President Yeltsin announced in Vancouver that Russia is suspending troop withdrawal from the Baltic States. This statement may have a negative effect on further Estonia's talks with Russia, minister Juri Luik, head of the Estonian delegation at the talks with Russia, said in his exclusive interview for Baltfax correspondent on Monday [5 April].

He made this statement in anticipation of his departure, as head of the Estonian delegation, to the next round of the Russian-Estonian talks scheduled for April 6-7 in Nakhabino in the suburbs of Moscow.

Mr Luik maintains that "such statements cannot facilitate the signing of the Russian-Estonian agreement on troop withdrawal nor contribute to the improvement of the Estonian-Russian relations as a whole." In his opinion, such statements "will not improve the situation of the Russian-speaking population residing in Estonia either." Previously, Russia was not putting its troops pullout in dependence on any specific conditions, he said. The emergence of such conditions is likely to affect the ground rules of the negotiating process, head of the Estonian delegation indicated.

"We regard these statements as an attempt at exerting pressure on Estonia and the domestic policy it is pursuing. We do not regard this approach as constructive, considering that the objective of the Vancouver Summit was to render assistance to Russian democracy and president Boris Yeltsin," Mr Luik said, emphasizing that "two weeks ago Estonia acknowledged its support to Boris Yeltsin when he had a trying time to endure." The Estonian diplomat accused "various political forces in Russia of taking advantage of the 'Baltic Card' in order to project their own 'national interests.' Yet, this is a very dangerous path: it's difficult to abandon it, while it's easy to find oneself up against the wall," Mr Luik said.

In the meantime, the Estonian minister conceded that in spite of President Yeltsin's statement, Estonia is not going to give up the idea of raising in Nakhabino the issue of holding a meeting of the two countries' state officials. "It could be a meeting of our defense ministers, prime ministers or even the presidents of the two countries. We are open for it," the Estonian representative said.

Latvian Leader Expresses Concern*OW0504194793 Moscow BALTFAX in English 1907 GMT
5 Apr 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Head of the Latvian government Anatolijs Gorbunovs has expressed concern with President Yeltsin's statement in Vancouver when the Russian president announced that Russia is suspending its troops withdrawal from the Baltic states.

President Yeltsin said at a press conference in Vancouver that Russia will put withdrawal of the Russian troops in dependence on the solution of human rights issues in regards to the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states.

In his statement which was circulated in Riga on Monday [5 April], Gorbunovs said that "the army cannot be resorted to as a means of political dictate."

In the opinion of the Latvian leader, human rights issues need to be addressed by the UN, the CSCE conference, or in the course of bilateral talks between the two countries.

Gorbunovs indicated that he intends to appeal to the CSCE and the UN asking these international organizations to send their observers to the Latvian-Russian talks on the troops withdrawal.

Estonia, Latvia Hit Russian 'Interference'

LD0504212793 Riga Radio Riga International in English
2030 GMT 5 Apr 93

[Excerpts] Estonia and Latvia today slammed President Boris Yeltsin's comments linking troop withdrawals to rights for Russian communities, accusing Moscow of wanting to dominate the Baltic states. [passage omitted] According to deputy head of the Latvian Parliament Valdis Birkavs, this is crude interference in Latvia's internal affairs. We will cope with the problem of Russian population in Latvia ourselves on the basis of respect for human rights. [passage omitted]

Latvia's Birkavs said Yeltsin's remarks were aimed at forcing the state to change its citizenship law ahead of parliamentary elections this summer. This is crude political pressure, he said, and appealed to Western public opinion for support. [passage omitted]

Russian Foreign Ministry Statement on Baltic Withdrawal

LD0204154593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1517 GMT
2 Apr 93

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS—The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics has been complicated by the absence of interstate agreements to regulate the procedure, order, conditions and time of withdrawal, as well as measures of social protection of servicemen and members of their families in accordance with the norms of the international law, says a statement circulated here today by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

"The Baltics official circles have been drawing the international public's attention to the situation around the troops withdrawal," says the document. The temporary suspension of the withdrawal till the conclusion of corresponding agreements is envisaged by a Russian president instruction of October 29, 1992, which was conveyed to heads of all CSCE states in personal messages of Boris Yeltsin.

"Riga, Vilnius and Tallinn perfectly understand the troops withdrawal was not fully suspended," says the statement. The Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed the intention of the Russian leadership to withdraw the troops from the Baltics in a short but real period of time remains unchanged.

"In order to do it it is necessary to pull efforts for the soonest coordination of draft agreements, which have long been on negotiations' table and concern vital interests of not only the Russian servicemen, but also military pensioners and civil personnel of military enterprises located on territory of the Baltics," stressed the statement.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Nuclear Test Ban Urged as Moratorium End Approaches

PM2503114593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Mar 93 First Edition p 7

[Valentina Chernega report: "'Icecap' May Blow Up in July"]

[Text] It is already obvious that the Nonproliferation Treaty, which expires in 1995, is bursting at the seams.

It has been learned in Moscow from competent sources that the U.S. Department of Energy has informed Russia that nuclear weapons tests are to resume at a Nevada test range. Representatives of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Ministry of Atomic Energy have received confidential notification No. 92-59/3 from the United States to the effect that an explosion code-named "Icecap" is planned for 28 July.

We would recall that the moratorium on nuclear testing ends 1 July. The United States plans 15 explosions over the next 4 years. Russia will not be lagging behind either. Viktor Mikhaylov, leader of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, has 12 tests slated for the same period.

A press conference was held Saturday [20 March] with the participation of activists from the international movement "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War," the "To Novaya Zemlya" environmental safety movement, and the "National Consensus" international committee. Representatives of these organizations called on countries with nuclear arsenals for the umpteenth time to resume talks aimed at ending all nuclear weapons testing.

If agreement on the universal and total ending of nuclear explosions is not reached today—when the "cold war" is a thing of the past—we will be leaving future generations a disfigured earth and a genetic legacy of cancer and leukemia.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Russian Scientist Describes CW Programs

93WC0038A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No 6, Feb 93 pp 40-41

[Interview with Russian scientist Vladimir Uglev by Oleg Vishnyakov: "Interview with a Noose Around the Neck"; first paragraph is NOVOYE VREMYA introduction]

[Text] One of the creators of the domestic binary bomb asserts that this weapon is kept at a secret base in Bryansk Oblast.

He came a half hour before the stipulated time. He admitted that he was very nervous and did not sleep the entire night, preparing for the very interview of his life. Vladimir Uglev, until recently one of the leading Soviet scientists in the area of chemical weapons, who worked for 15 of his 46 years under particular secrecy in the closed city of Volsk-17 (about 100 km from Saratov), nevertheless agreed to the conversation. In his words, he does not see any other way of

publicly supporting his colleague Vil Mirzayanov, who has been subjected to criminal prosecution for supposedly divulging a state secret.

The "Mirzayanov case" has received extensive publicity in the Russian and world press. NOVOYE VREMYA was the first publication that was able to interview the scientist—the day before his arrest. In that issue, Mirzayanov told of a new class of toxic chemical agents obtained in the USSR, whose toxicity exceeds the heretofore known kinds of such compounds, and about a binary weapon created on its basis that violates if not the letter then the spirit of international agreements.

NOVOYE VREMYA then carried out its own investigation of the "case of the binary bomb." We were able to interview Andrey Zheleznyakov, the engineer from the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology (GSNIIOKhT) who participated in the laboratory experiments with the binary weapon on the basis of a substance under the code name of "Novichok" [Novice]. As the result of an accident, Zheleznyakov was subjected to the effects of "Novichok" and became an invalid for life.

The creator of this deadly weapon himself now sat in my editor's office.

Vishnyakov: Vladimir Ivanovich, to begin, how did you come to military chemistry?

Uglev: I finished the Moscow Chemical-Technological Institute in 1975 and was allocated to the Volsk branch of GSNIIOKhT. I immediately found myself in the group of a renowned scientist who dealt with the development of new kinds of toxic agents. I will not give the family name of this person, for he continues to work at the institute. It was precisely he who in 1973 for the first time was able to obtain a fundamentally new phosphoric toxic agent with a paralytic action on the nerves that subsequently received the name "Novichok."

When I came to the laboratory, the work on the synthesis of the new compound was in full swing. They had carried out the initial investigations and obtained the first results. During the entire 15 years of my work in the laboratory, more than a hundred substances of this class were synthesized. Only five of them representing a significant "war interest" went through the full investigation. The dubious honor of discovering three of them belongs to me.

Vishnyakov: What does "full investigation" mean?

Uglev: The substance went through all three stages of the check: measurement of basic parameters, development of a technology of use, and, finally, field tests.

Vishnyakov: Accordingly, the new substance was tested at the proving grounds at Shikhany?

Uglev: I myself took part in the tests more than once. Several kilograms of the substance were produced for each test on the experimental equipment. In principle, 1 kg would be enough to kill thousands of people.

Vishnyakov: In the interview with our journal and in other publications, Vil Mirzayanov declared that the combat

possibilities of the new compound exceed by a factor of five to eight the most powerful of the toxic agents now in existence—VX gas. The American press then gave the opinion of a specialist who said that this is impossible....

Uglev: It is possible. Laboratory investigations have indeed proven that the combat characteristics of the new substance and VX must be approximately the same. But it became clear after tests on the range that our "product" is significantly more effective. The military people who handled these tests were long reluctant to report their conclusions to higher levels—they seemed so improbable.

Vishnyakov: Still, how many times more powerful than VX is your "creation."

Uglev: Naturally I do not have precise data with me. The military people have whispered to me that it is a minimum of 5-10 times.

Vishnyakov: Do you think that your discovery is comparable with that of the Swedish chemist Tammilin, who first synthesized VX in 1956?

Uglev: It is not up to me to judge that. I will note only that our scientists were close to the discovery of the new substance as early as the mid-1950's. It was only later that I discovered their calculations when I was working in the secret archives. But all their cards got shuffled by the reconnaissance report on the success of the Swedish scientist—the work was stopped and all of the efforts went into the creation of their own VX.

Vishnyakov: Your discovery must have created a furor in scientific circles....

Uglev: So it was, although initially we made every effort to keep the results of our work secret from our colleagues. This would have made it possible for us calmly to continue the research. But Viktor Petrunin, then deputy director of the Volsk branch, hurriedly reported on the success to Moscow. And then GSNIIOKhT Director Ivan Martynov immediately came to Volsk-17.

They provided us with first-class equipment. "You just work," they were saying. We continued the experiments but we no longer felt free. All of the experiments in our laboratory had the status of "especially important work," which in those years was considered the highest form of secrecy. All reports—written by hand, as required—went directly to Moscow, to the GSNIIOKhT.

Then, in 1976, we submitted an official claim for an inventor's certificate. Years passed and there was no answer from Moscow. Only after 8 years did I find out quite accidentally that totally different people wrote their candidate's and doctoral dissertations using the materials of the reports that we had been sending to Moscow. One of them was Bors Martynov, son of the then director of the GSNIIOKhT.

It then became clear that they had very simply stolen our invention and I wrote a letter to the director. They summoned me and my chief to Moscow and showed us the documents. The applications from 1976 had been replaced

and our signatures forged. They offered us a deal—a substantial promotion in exchange for silence—but we refused. After much discussion we were able to exclude “extra” people from the application but no one thought about taking away their university degrees. Boris Martynov, a doctor of chemical sciences, continues to head a laboratory in the GSNIIOKhT.

I am convinced that this theft could not have occurred without the active assistance of Viktor Petrunin, a person without any moral principles whatsoever, in my view. He soon had a giddy career and now occupies the director’s chair of the GSNIIOKhT.

Vishnyakov: Is it true that neither the substance that you synthesized nor its components (precursors) was included in any one of the three lists of chemical substances or intermediate products whose stocks are subject under the Geneva Convention to mandatory declaration and inspection?

Uglev: This is indeed so. In addition, even after having destroyed or “mothballed” all production capacities for the production of toxic substances in accordance with the convention, it will be quite easy in the event that something happens for us to organize the production of a new compound using the products of domestic peaceable chemistry. It is merely necessary to know the technology. This is still another “advantage” of the compound over other phosphoric toxic substances: sarin, soman, and VX.

Vishnyakov: The managers of our military-chemical complex assert that Russia has never had and does not have a binary chemical weapon. Is this so?

Uglev: This is not true. Of the three new toxic substances that I synthesized, one is a basic component of a binary that, according to my information, has gone through successful testing on the range.

I have information on the existence in Russia of a minimum of one kind of binary weapon made on the basis of the so-called “Novocheboksarskiy product,” a substance that we declared as VX in all international agreements. I assume that the work on both binaries was performed simultaneously.

Vishnyakov: In the case at hand, however, you speak of studies and tests but not of production. In the opinion of military people, a study does not count.

Uglev: I know about production as well: a certain quantity of components of a binary weapon is now being kept at a secret storage depot somewhere in Bryansk Oblast. If, of course, they have not yet destroyed it, “covering their tracks.”

There is, after all, indirect evidence of the existence of a binary weapon—the Lenin Prize received by A. Kuntsevich, V. Petrunin, and other “strategists” in the spring of 1991. This could happen only after the issue of an experimental-industrial batch of the product.

Vishnyakov: Can the components of the Russian binary be used individually in the domestic economy?

Uglev: Such a weapon, if it existed, would be ideal for the military in every way. Any country, even after obligating

itself not to produce chemical weapons, could nevertheless calmly produce components of the binary at civilian plants and utilize them as pesticides or dyes and if necessary always be ready for a chemical war. As far as I know, however, such a consummate weapon does not yet exist. At the same time, the substance that I synthesized can relatively easily be “masked” as a product of peaceable chemistry in the event of a sudden inspection.

As for the other nonbasic component of the binary on the basis of the new substance, it has a rather respectable application in the national economy.

Vishnyakov: In what area?

Uglev: I would not want to answer this question.

Vishnyakov: In September of last year, the press published a list of chemicals and technologies with dual applications. Their export now requires special licenses. The directive was signed by B.N. Yeltsin personally. Mirzayanov asserts that this list does not include either the component of the new substance nor the “Novocheboksarskiy VX.” Accordingly, they may calmly be exported from the country.

Uglev: It is true that neither the one nor the other is found there. The list indicates the components of a binary on the basis of VX but the “classic” VX rather than the one that was produced in Novocheboksary over the course of 15 years. Although the “Novocheboksarskiy product” has the same empirical formula as $VX-C_{11}H_{26}O_2PSN$ —it differs substantially on the level of the radicals. Essentially this substance is only a related V-gas, which, however, does not lessen its military possibilities.

Vishnyakov: But the president’s advisers (apparently we are again talking about A. Kuntsevich) who prepared this list could not fail to know that it is incomplete. Did they really consciously deceive people?

Uglev: I have no other answer to this question. In my opinion, these people could be guided by two motives: the possibility of the unhindered sale of strategic chemicals and technologies to countries like Iraq, Libya, or North Korea (I remind you that none of these countries has joined the Geneva Convention) and enrich themselves or, what is more probable, simply to “set up” the president just before the signing of the convention, thus curbing the process of chemical disarmament. Nor do I rule out the possibility of a deal between Russian and American military chemists for the purpose of hindering detente.

Vishnyakov: Are you serious?

Uglev: You will understand that neither Kuntsevich nor Petrunin nor their American “colleagues” need chemical disarmament. When I came to Volsk-17 as a young man, I supposed that the country needs chemical weapons, for otherwise the Americans would long ago have unleashed a chemical war against us. But I could not get an answer from our military people to the simple question: Do we have any sort of a concept for the use of this kind of weapon? Even today I am convinced that we never had such a concept—chemical weapons were just a good means of existence for

our generals, a "feed trough" in the form of state prizes, awards, and appropriations for studies.

They are now trying to forget about this but in the days of the coup in August 1991 the generals of the chemical forces were among the first to welcome the "restoration of order" and declared their support for the participants in the putsch.

Vishnyakov: You understand that after the publication of this interview you may share the fate of Vil Mirzayanov?

Uglev: I made this decision quite consciously and internally I am prepared for the possible consequences.

Chuvashia: Environmental Objections to CW Destruction

93WC0046A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 11, 12 Mar 93 p 15

[Article by Vladimir Shcherbak, candidate of chemical sciences and chief of the ASKO Center Chemical Technology Department in Cheboksary: "Facilities To Destroy Chemical Weapons Debated"]

[Text] In the past 6 months the leadership of the Khimprom (Chemical Industry) production association (notably, its Director-General Leonid Shevnitsyn) has been actively advocating that the head plant for the destruction of chemical weapons be located in one of its departments.

This project was discussed during Ruslan Khasbulatov's visit to Chuvashia. It was also reported to President Yeltsin during his visit to the republic last September.

This project is based on a concept advanced by Anatoly Kuntsevich, Chairman of the Committee on the Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, which is under the auspices of the President of Russia. Chemical weapons, presumably, must be destroyed at the facilities where they were produced. What will be in store for us in this case? The return of highly toxic phosphorus war gases from storage facilities all over Russia to Chuvashia—where V-gas has been manufactured. In what way? Along the very same Cheboksary-Kanash railway track, which has not been repaired in all the years since these "products" were made.

Therefore the task set by Kuntsevich is generally not feasible without reconstruction.

One of the main arguments in favour of the project is the high skill of the personnel of the department which produced the war gases. But this work force unit actually does not exist today. The majority are on pension and severely ill. And even the safety systems no longer assure the previous guarantees of reliability.

It's amazing, but Kuntsevich doesn't shun even downright lying when he says that not the slightest accident, let alone emergency, occurred in all the years war gases were produced in Chuvashia (this was from 1972 to 1987). Why has he forgotten the big fire which broke out at the same department in 1974, 2 years after the production of V-gas had been launched? This resulted in the dispersion of tens of tons of produce and the contamination of the plant and city's territory within a radius of 30 km. This can be read

about in the reports of the Moscow Institute of Biophysics under the USSR Ministry of Public Health.

The consequences of this fire were not seriously studied and have not been fully eliminated to this day. Neither were its causes named, though they are self-evident: it was impermissible to undertake dangerous production in a new department while keeping the old wooden storehouse intact. Mentally retarded children are being born in the contaminated zone; we in general do not know all the medical and ecological consequences of that fire.

Today sovereign Chuvashia has legislatively banned toxic agents being brought to its territory and is firmly bent on observing its own laws. On December 25, 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Chuvash Republic ruled: "The destruction of chemical weapons and the placing of facilities for their elimination shall be prohibited on Chuvashia's territory." This resolution was stipulated by vital necessity: it is impermissible to locate dangerous production in an area with the highest population density in Russia (34 persons per sq km). This would be suicidal.

Kuntsevich will, willy-nilly, have to return to the concept of chemical weapons destruction which has now been accepted in the USA: weapons are destroyed where they are now stored. But even this will have to be done with circumspection. At present, the large-scale destruction of these weapons is impossible in Russia due to lack of ecologically-pure technologies. Russian scientists are only discussing the likely ways of destroying war gases; these are, in effect, search procedures.

To the regret and concern of Chuvashia's inhabitants, the plans of Kuntsevich-Shevnitsyn have been supported by the Chairman of the Republican Supreme Soviet Kubarev. And as to the commission set up to investigate the 1974 fire, it has not got down to work, despite a direct instruction from the Yeltsin administration.

Difficulty in Meeting Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadlines

PM2403152393 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 2000 GMT 20 Mar 93

[By I. Deryugin and Ye. Gerasimenko from Saratov; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Deryugin] The veil of secrecy surrounding the Organic Synthesis Technology Institute and the military test range in Shikhany is being lifted. Both installations were involved in chemical weapons development but are now part of a government program as installations perfecting technologies to destroy these weapons. However, a great deal remains unclear.

Military scientists think that it will be extremely hard for our country to keep to the time frames laid down in the international Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as regards the destruction of war gases since we have not yet perfected technologies for the destruction of various kinds of chemical weapons. The specific areas where this will occur have not been decided, and the government program has itself been sent back for considerable further

work. The residential area of Shikhany, inhabited by 15,000 people, has not as yet received the special status conferred on an installation associated with chemical weapons destruction. This is arousing concern among the local population, who are demanding compensation and concessions for living in this special zone.

Third-Generation CW Said Still Produced

93P50137A Moscow VEK in Russian
No 12, 26 Mar-1 Apr 93 p 2

[Vladimir Gusar article: "Third-Generation Chemical Weapons Are Being Produced and Tested as Before"]

[Text] In May 1993 an International Scientific-Practical Conference on Chemical Disarmament will be held in Moscow. A.D. Kuntsevich, a lieutenant general of the Chemical Troops and chairman of the Russian President's Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, has been confirmed as the chairman of the preparatory committee.

In its time the appointment of the "chemical" General Kuntsevich, who had been involved in the development of the newest types of chemical weapons [CW], to a post concerned with disarmament called forth skepticism from observers at home and abroad. His name is closely connected with the "Mirzayanov affair." There is no doubt that Russian scientists will be carefully hand-picked, and that disgraced chemists will hardly be allowed to attend.

In January 1993 the committee headed by Kuntsevich tried to push through the Supreme Soviet its own variant of a CW disarmament program. It envisaged transporting CW by rail from chemical bases scattered all over the country to the places where they had been produced and destroying them there by incineration. Then Kuntsevich's agency asked for half a billion dollars just for so-called inspection trips to the United States.

It has just come out that the program, which was rejected at the time in open hearings, was secretly approved all the same by the members of parliament. Evidence of this leaked out through the disagreements between Kuntsevich and another "chemical" general—Deputy Chemical Troops Commander Yestafyev. Today some of them are trying to promptly move all CW to the places where they were produced, while others are continuing to produce CW and their components—so-called "third-generation weapons"—in violation of a convention which has already been signed. The effectiveness of these weapons is 10 to 15 times higher than that of the nerve-paralytic weapons already in our arsenal—weapons like sarin, soman and yperite [Y-gaz].

As VEK was able to elucidate, the most important CW development and testing centers are located within the Moscow city limits (the State Scientific Research Institute for Organic and Chemical Technology—GNIIOKhT). In addition to this, development of and experiments with toxic substances for military use are conducted at the Military Chemical Defense Academy near the Bauman metro station, in the strictly secret Scientific Research Institute for Chemical Machinery, and at a CW test site. Quite recently it became known that since the 1920's a military-chemical test

site had been functioning in Kuzminki, where various types of chemicals are tested. At the beginning of the 1960's this test site was closed off; nearby, without any decontamination measures, a park was set up and housing built. Quite recently it became known that the test site was continuing to function.

But until now, neither General Kuntsevich's agency, nor the General Staff, nor the command of the Chemical Troops has given the public any information about the locations of CW burial sites in and around Moscow, nor data about chemical test sites in that area. In its time the Soviet Army's main chemical warehouse—Warehouse No 136—was located in the Moscow area, and no fewer than four Moscow factories produced toxic substances for military use. According to unofficial information, live chemical munitions were dumped into the river at the point where the Setun River flows into the Moscow River! But there is no real chemical disarmament program; to this very day the production of toxic substances has not been completely stopped. What are they going to talk about at the International Conference?

Offers of Help With Weapons Dismantling Welcomed

PM2903141093 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Mar 93 p 2

[Mikhail Pogorelyy article: "Difficulties Still To Come"]

[Text] In the 2 months since the signing of the Convention on Chemical Weapons in Paris, 10 more states have acceded to this agreement. So the number of countries that have embarked on the path of renouncing the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has reached 140. But only two states have yet ratified the convention—Fiji and Mauritius. The document stipulates that it will come into force 180 days after its ratification by at least 65 participants, but not later than 2 years after it was signed.

So after 13 January 1995 one more problem will be added to all our others—the need to destroy chemical weapon stockpiles. For Russia, this will be a particularly difficult task. Fulfilling our commitments under the convention will require not only the formal consideration of a new factor in international politics, but also very substantial financial expenditure.

In Russia, as President Yeltsin expressively put it the other day, several times more chemical weapons have been stockpiled than could possibly be needed by all the countries in the world. And unlike the United States we have no ready-made infrastructure for the destruction of the lethal stockpiles. Creating one would take, according to various estimates, several billion (!) dollars. Obviously that is a burden beyond Russia's powers. And we cannot cope with it single-handed. Therefore what is now particularly interesting and relevant is the experience of France, the FRG, Italy, and other countries, which have decided, on their own initiative, to help us in the cause of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. International assistance would help, on the one hand, to make not only Russia but the entire world safer,

and on the other, to lift part of the financial and economic burden from the shoulders of our state and ultimately the Russian people.

Denial of Alleged BW Work in Tomsk

93P50127A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
30 Mar 93 p 1

[Item under the heading "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow"]

[Text] BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS [BW] WERE NEVER PRODUCED IN TOMSK. THIS WAS CATEGORICALLY STATED BY MANY LOCAL SPECIALISTS WORKING IN THE BIOLOGICAL INDUSTRY, WHO WERE QUESTIONED.

The questioning was occasioned by the alarm of the inhabitants of this city, which is crammed with defense enterprises. They were agitated by a publication on this theme in the American magazine NEWSWEEK, and especially by its reprinting in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

FRANCE

Government 'May' Resume Nuclear Tests Under Defense Pressure

AU3003124093 Paris AFP in English 1212 GMT
30 Mar 93

[Text] Paris, March 30 (AFP)—France may resume nuclear tests in the Pacific under pressure from the defence establishment who consider them essential for the modernisation of the country's nuclear deterrent, defence experts said on Tuesday [29 March].

They said socialist President Francois Mitterrand and the new right-wing government expected to be appointed later on Tuesday would likely agree on the need to resume testing.

Mitterrand said during the legislative election campaign that ended with the crushing of his Socialist Party that France would not resume testing until the United States and the Soviet Union did the same. French tests were suspended a year ago.

In other fields where Mitterrand and the government of new Prime Minister Edouard Balladur differ, the right would have to seek compromise with the head of state, whose constitutional prerogative, as he recalled Monday [28 March], gives him control of defence and foreign policy.

The right-wing alliance of the Gaullist Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the centre-right Union for French Democracy (UDF) agree with the president on the need to keep an updated nuclear deterrent, but the RPR is believed to favour development of a new land-based nuclear weapon alongside the strategic M5 sea-land strategic missile being built for the country's nuclear submarines.

The right is in agreement with Mitterrand on what it called "creation of a pillar of European security" under the aegis of the Western European Union (WEU), and a European armaments agency to be created under the Maastricht treaty on European unity.

But it wants to "clarify" relations with NATO, with the RPR wishing to take part in certain NATO bodies, such as the defence planning committee but stopping short of rejoining the integrated military command.

It will be difficult for the new government to increase the defence budget of around 36 billion dollars during the recession. New weapons programmes will likely have to wait until 1995, the experts said.

Lack of cash was also expected to defer the right's plans to phase out conscription and increase the size of the professional army. Ending conscription over a 5-year period would cost 4.5 billion dollars, and in any case Mitterrand favours conscription.

GERMANY

Bundeswehr Reported To Reduce W. Laender Arsenals

AU1803131293 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 18 Mar 93 p 4

["rei" report: "Bundeswehr Is Reducing Its Arsenals"]

[Text] Bonn, 17 Mar—This year the Bundeswehr wants to begin reducing its western arsenals. Up until now it has exclusively destroyed weapons from the stocks of the former GDR National People's Army (NVA). According to a report on the current state of the CSCE treaty on arms control in Europe [CFE] which was published by the FRG Defense Ministry on Wednesday [17 March], companies in the new laender have destroyed 122 BTR-40 armored personnel carriers, 116 T-54/55 combat tanks, 39 mortars, and 17 MiG-21 combat aircraft of the NVA since the summer. At the moment, contracts for the destruction of 642 Western M-48 combat tanks are being prepared.

According to its treaty obligations, the FRG has to reduce its arsenals by 2,726 tanks, 5,171 armored vehicles, 1,904 artillery guns, and 123 combat aircraft by the end of 1995. Most of that is to be destroyed. Some weapons systems will be taken to military history museums or transferred to other NATO partner states.

The destruction of the weapons, which Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (Christian Democratic Union) and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (Free Democratic Party of Germany) symbolically started by handing over a welding torch in Rockensussra/Thuringia last August, is expensive. Destroying one combat tank costs 10,000 German marks [DM] and destroying one combat aircraft costs DM47,000.

The 1993 federal budget envisages DM220 million for the removal and destruction of military materiel. NATO provides subsidies amounting to \$1,000 per piece of equipment from its infrastructure program, to which the FRG for its part contributes about 27 percent.

Russian Troop Withdrawal Running 'According to Plan'

LD2903112193 Berlin ADN in German 1127 GMT
29 Mar 93

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The withdrawal of the Western Group of Russian troops from Germany is running according to plan, according to information from the government's commissioner. Over the past 2 years, 330,000 of the 546,000 soldiers, civilian employees, and family members of the Western Group left the Federal Republic, Major General Hartmut Foertsch said at a press conference in Berlin today. This means the accelerated withdrawal agreed upon between Germany and Russia will be concluded by 31 August 1994.

According to Foertsch, an additional 164,000 soldiers, civilian employees, and family members will return to the former Soviet Union this year. This means 66 bases will be "completely" emptied.


The federal states of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania will be "largely free of Russian troops" by the end of the year. The last Western Group troops had already left Thuringia by November of last year.

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